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The goal of this thesis is to investigate the link between income inequality and corruption and 
poses the following research question: Is there a positive relationship from income inequality to 
corruption and is this effect dependent on trust? The thesis attempts to contribute to the small but 
growing literature on this link by using recent data with a global coverage. In addition to the 
independent variables, income inequality and trust, relevant control variables were added to the 
model. For the analysis I use the method of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The results are 
surprising in that they reveal that income inequality has both a positive and negative correlation 
to corruption, depending on the level of trust. These are interesting results and contradict much 
of the literature. But as there are several issues concerning the quality and availability of the data, 
I refer from making strong conclusions. Most importantly, my findings reveal that there is a need 
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Equaling an estimated 5% of global GDP (Ferguson, 2017), corruption has received an 
increasing amount of attention from both policy-makers and researchers (e.g., Batabyal & 
Chowdhury, 2015; Chetwynd, Chetwynd, & Spector, 2003; Gupta, Davoodi, & Alonso-Terme, 
1998; J.-S. You & Khagram, 2005). Former UN General Secretary Ban Ki-Moon (2012) claimed 
that approximately 30 percent of development assistance does not reach its final destination due 
to corruption. According to Transparency International (2017), nearly a quarter of the world’s 
population has paid a bribe. World Bank President Jim Yong Kim declared that corruption is 
“public enemy no. 1” and that “every dollar that a corrupt official or corrupt business person puts 
in his or her pockets is a dollar stolen from a pregnant woman who needs healthcare, or from a 
girl or boy who deserves an education, or from communities that need water, roads and schools” 
(Ferguson, 2017, p. 4).  
 
New measurements of corruption, developed over the last two decades, provide the possibility 
for quantitative research and has yielded an increasing number of studies (see e.g., Rothstein & 
Uslaner, 2005; Uslaner, 2005; J.-S. You, 2006). Indexes, chief among them the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency International, are invaluable tools in global comparative 
research into the causes and consequences of corruption. Many of these reports include media-
friendly scores and rankings, popularizing their use.  
 
According to a report commissioned by NORAD (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011), the lack of progress in 
combatting corruption in the last 15 years is due to imprecise measurement instruments, 
conceptual flaws and inadequate strategies (Ferguson, 2017). Corruption has many forms and 
many causes, which do not readily provide grounds for a comprehensive universal theory or the 
subsequent tools and methods that would follow. The current regime of anti-corruption methods 
focusses in large part on institutional and legal development. Most initiatives fall into the 
category of anticrime initiatives, based on constraining or otherwise affecting an individual’s 
decision making and propensity to participate in criminal acts (Ferguson, 2017; Søreide, 2014). 
These are, naturally, important areas in which corruption can be fought, but I do not believe that 
this focus is sufficient. Institutions and companies do not exist in a void, they are an inherent part 
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of, and result of, cultures and societies. This is acknowledged in the increase in interest on the 
underlying socio-political determinants of corruption.  
 
In a relevant, but unrelated, development there has been a growing interest in inequality, 
especially following the translated versions of Piketty’s book Capital (Piketty, 2014). Already 
the year before, in 2013, the World Bank “twinned its goal for ending poverty with the need for 
shared prosperity” (Hardoon, 2017, p. 2). Similarly, IMF’s Managing Director Christine Lagarde 
recently spoke of the importance of reducing income inequality while newspapers like the Wall 
Street Journal and Forbes regularly run articles on economic inequality (Lagarde, 2018). In 2015, 
the leaders of 193 countries committed to reduce inequality under goal 10 of the UN’s 
Sustainable Development Goals. In the NGO sector, Oxfam created the Commitment to 
Reducing Inequality Index, which measures 157 countries according to government action on 
social spending, tax and labor rights – three areas that they find to be important in reducing 
inequality (Lawson & Martin, 2018). Research on inequality has provided a list of social-ills 
where income inequality is the primary explanatory variable (e.g., Era Dabla-Norris, Kochhar, 
Suphaphiphat, Ricka, & Tsounta, 2015; Gallego, 2016; Jordahl, 2007; World Bank, 2016).  
 
With the increasing attention that both corruption and inequality have received I would like to 
take a closer look at their causal relations. There is a growing literature on this relationship, but 
an additional variable is usually included to act as an intermediary between the two. One of the 
most cited researchers on the inequality to corruption link, Eric M. Uslaner, finds trust to be an 
integral part of what he calls the inequality trap (Uslaner, 2005). The inequality trap is supported 
by several other studies (e.g., Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; J.-S. You & Khagram, 2005) and 
argues that income inequality leads to lower levels of generalized trust, leading to more 
corruption, which in turn leads to higher income inequality and less trust.  
 
If the effect of inequality on corruption is mainly through an intermediary such as trust, it will be 
interesting to investigate this linkage as well as the literature that can shed light on the 
constituent causal relations. Additionally, both Rothstein and Uslaner’s (2005) and You and 
Khagram’s (2005) published their studies in 2005. Since then there have been many significant 
advances in the production of global indicators on several of the concepts employed in these and 
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other studies. It is therefore well worthwhile to re-investigate the inequality-trust-corruption link 
by testing it against new data.  
Following this, my research question is:  
 
Is there a positive relationship from income inequality to corruption and is this effect dependent 
on trust?  
 




2 DEFINING THE DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
In this chapter I will present the definitions of the dependent and independent variables. This is a 
necessary step before delving deeper into the literature in chapter 3. By defining the variables, I 
will more easily find relevant research and the most appropriate measurements.  
2.1 DEFINING CORRUPTION 
Corruption is a global phenomenon without a singular universal definition. As a concept it varies 
depending on cultural, political and economic factors. The UN Convention Against Corruption 
does not provide a full definition of corruption, instead, it describes a number of behaviors that 
signatories to the convention must criminalize as corruption and some behaviors that they should 
at least consider criminalizing (Ferguson, 2017). In a purely legal sense, “corruption is the type 
of behavior that a state has defined as corrupt” (Ferguson, 2017).  
 
To overcome the lack of a universal concept and definition, it is common to use a broad, generic 
definition of corruption, such as the World Bank’s “[corruption is] the exercise of public power 
for private gain” (Teorell et al., 2018) or Transparency International’s “corruption is the abuse of 
entrusted authority for private gain” (Transparency International, 2018c). By their very nature, 
perceptual measures of corruption bypass the narrow legal definitions in a country and instead 
reflect the cultural definitions (Zhang, Cao, & Vaughn, 2009).  
 
White-collar crime is a term closely associated with corruption. It was first used by the 
sociologist and criminologist Edwin Sutherland, who wrote in 1940: “crimes in business and the 
profession consist principally of violation of delegated or implied trust” (Zhang et al., 2009). It is 
interesting to note that trust plays an important part in this early definition. Although it is not 
always mentioned specifically, it is a constant, underlying element in any discussion on 
corruption and is included in Transparency International’s definition of corruption as abuse of 
entrusted authority.  
 
Corruption is loyalty to the in-group, not society as a whole, and flouts rules of fairness. Through 
patron-client relationships and misuse of public funds, either for private gain or rewarding those 
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loyal to those in power, money is transferred from the public to the elites, from the poor to the 
rich (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Uslaner, 2005).  
 
Corruption, such as paying a bribe, is for many about safety and not being the fool in a rotten 
system. It can be assurance that your doctor will have time for you, that your goods will enter the 
country efficiently, that you receive good grades at school and that you don’t pay taxes, taxes 
that you rarely see beneficial results of anyways. It can be viewed as a rational response to an 
unresponsive and broken system. These systems incentivize individuals with power to sell it as a 
service. This decreases the income of the state and its ability to provide public employees with a 
fair salary, leading to an increasing number of public employees extorting “funds from the public 
purse” (Uslaner, 2005). Which leads to lower economic growth and inefficient government. In 
this sense, in lieu of an objective measure of the quality of government, corruption is often 
considered an accepted measure of the quality of government (Uslaner, 2005).  
 
A definition of corruption should be globally understood and broad enough to include the private 
and public spheres. OECD’s definition of corruption as “abuse of entrusted authority for illicit 
gain” (OECD, 2012) does this, but by including illicit gain it opens up to local notions of what 
constitutes criminal acts. This is an interesting subject in itself, but one that is beyond the scope 
of this study1. The definition employed by Transparency International (TI) is “corruption is the 
abuse of entrusted authority for private gain” (Transparency International, 2018c). By including 
abuse of entrusted authority, they look broadly at the behavior of those with power in all sectors 
of society, both public and private. Unlike with OECD’s illicit gain, TI’s private gain seeks to 
avoid purely legal interpretations. Transparency International’s definition meets the above-
mentioned requirements of a good definition and is the definition employed in this study.  
 
                                                 
1 Criticism of modern definitions of corruption are often founded in cultural norms. Many cultures include the idea 
of a middle-man or contact that provides help to friends and family, in China this is called guanzi, in Arabic, wasta 
and in Russia, blat. Whether done for personal gain or seen as performing a distributive function, these personal 
networks exist to circumvent formal procedures and obtain goods and services in short supply (Ferguson, 2017).  
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2.2 DEFINING INEQUALITY 
In popular culture the term the 1% is often used to refer to the increasing wealth of the richest 
1% of the population, who since 2015 own more wealth than the rest of the world combined. 
Additional examples of this inequality in recent years are that the eight richest people own as 
much wealth as the poorest half of the world and that in the US the last 30 years have seen no 
real growth in incomes for the bottom 50%, while the incomes for the top 1% have grown by 
300% (Hardoon, 2017).  
 
Inequality is at its most basic a lack of equality, in rights, status, opportunities or outcomes. 
Inequality of outcomes concerns itself with inequalities in living conditions and economic 
conditions, of which inequalities in health, education, nutrition and income have received much 
attention in research (Afonso, LaFleur, & Alarcón, 2015).  
 
In addition to inequality of outcomes, there is inequality of opportunity. It concerns itself with 
many of the same issues but focuses on what the individual cannot control. Individuals cannot 
choose what ethnicity or gender they are born as or what socioeconomic strata they are born into. 
Rothstein and Uslaner employ a narrow definition of equality of opportunity based on whether 
governments ensue public policies that are “intended to create equal conditions for citizens 
regardless of their income, ethnic/religious background, sex, and race in areas such as health 
care, education, and social security and legal protection” (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005, p. 42). 
This definition focuses on individuals not only having access to healthcare and education but 
whether there are policies actively seeking to create equality of opportunity, recognizing that this 
requires a fair starting point for all. 
 
In this thesis, inequality denotes income inequality. Income is the “revenue streams from wages, 
salaries, interest on a savings account, dividends from shares of stock, rent, and profits from 
selling something for more than you paid for it” (Inequality.org, 2018). Income inequality refers 
to the uneven distribution of income among individuals in a group, a population, a country or 
globally. The merits and limitations of the different measurements of income inequality will be 




2.3 DEFINING TRUST 
The relevance of trust is integral to the definition of corruption employed in this thesis: the abuse 
of entrusted power for private gain. Although trust a popular topic of research, there is currently 
no general theory or universal definition of trust (Delhey & Newton, 2005). Despite this, we can 
assume certain general characteristics. Rachel Botsman defines trust as a “confident relationship 
with the unknown” (Botsman, 2017). This definition is supported by Uslaner (Uslaner, 2013b) 
who views the unknown as risk. According to him, trust presupposes risk - and gives risk the 
benefit of the doubt. This can be done consciously through management of risk (strategic trust) 
or by downplaying dangers through what he calls generalized trust, what some call social trust or 
moralistic trust. Dangers are not dismissed, but evidence is interpreted in a more positive light - 
what the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann called “confidence in one’s expectations” 
(Botsman, 2017). Being able to trust is an important tool to navigate the world. This is especially 
true in a world where urbanization and globalization combine to contribute to an increasing 
complexity and vulnerability. Through trust, people can downplay the fact that they have little to 
no control over what happens in the world around them. The complexity of the world and the 
uncertainty that follows are both reduced through generalized trust. This is a term that concerns 
the out-group, those beyond the radius of social interactions in an individual’s life.  
When we expect someone to do something there is always the possibility for them to not do that 
thing, when we trust someone, we have confidence in our expectations that they will. This risk is 
inherent in any definition of trust. Trust enables us to believe that we are in control of our 
environment and that we can make it better. As Kenneth Newton writes:  
“We define trust as the belief that others will not deliberately or knowingly do us harm, if 
they can avoid it, and will look after our interests, if this is possible. This is consistent 
with a common sense idea of what trust is—that we trust others when we feel we can walk 
the streets without being mugged, will not be treated unjustly by officials, exploited at 
work, deceived by politicians, treated badly by friends, acquaintances, or strangers, or 
cheated in everyday life” (Newton, 2007, p. 3).  
 
Generalized trust is closely associated with terms such as mutuality, solidarity, respect, civility 
and reciprocity. Although not synonyms or definitions, they help delineate a concept. Further 
delineating a working definition of generalized trust is its opposite: particularized trust 
(Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005, p. 45). Particularized trust denotes a trust reserved for one’s own 
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specific group in society, defined by its boundaries to other groups. This group can be small, 
only including family and friends, or large, including those belonging to one’s own religion, 
ethnicity, class or other social sub-groups. In societies with little generalized trust, particularized 
trust plays an important role2.  
 
We cannot know the intention of others, least of all those we do not know, yet generalized trust 
is the belief that we should trust others because they are part of our wider moral community 
(Uslaner, 2013b). The discussion on measurements of generalized trust is located in section 
5.2.3.  
 
                                                 
2 A statement summarizing this sentiment well might be akin to something I heard several times, from different 
people, on a visit to Russia: “90 percent of my fellow citizens are stupid and untrustworthy; I only trust my friends 
and family”.  
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Thematically this thesis falls under several broad literatures: the literature on inequality, the 
literature on corruption, and the literature investigating the relationship between these two 
variables and trust. The latter relationship deals with the inequality trap and is of particular 
interest to this thesis. However, before getting there I will situate this study in the broader 
contexts of the literature on corruption and inequality.  
3.1 CORRUPTION 
In very broad strokes, the literature on corruption can be subdivided into causes and 
consequences of corruption. In other words, research that treats corruption as a dependent 
variable and research that treats it as an independent variable. This dissertation falls into the 
former category, but a short review of the consequences of corruption is warranted.  
3.1.1 Consequences of Corruption 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the negative consequences of corruption are many, both for a 
country’s economic growth and measures on human development. By looking at the World 
Value Survey from 1981, 1990 and 1995-97, Eric M. Uslaner (2005) found that respondents in 
countries where corruption was believed to be widespread were more likely to believe that luck 
and connections were more important than hard work, less likely to believe in a bright future and 
more likely to buy stolen goods, cheat on taxes or take bribes. The main detrimental effects of 
corruption, according to Gerry Ferguson in his book Global Corruption: Law, Theory and 
Practice (2017) are that it; increases the cost of doing business; leads to waste or the inefficient 
use of public resources; excludes poor people from public services and perpetuates poverty; 
corrodes public trust; undermines the rule of law, ultimately delegitimizing the state. More 
broadly, he adds that corruption has negative effects on human rights, gender equality, global 
security and climate change and environmental degradation (Ferguson, 2017, p. 7).  
 
Many studies have examined corruption in relation to its many adverse effects, with both 
economic development and governance indicators receiving attention. Gupta, Davoodi and 
Alonso-Terme (1998) argue that corruption increases poverty and income inequality and 




In his 2008 book The Poverty of Corrupt Nations, Roy Cullen writes that “Nations where 
corruption is rampant also tend to have a large proportion of the population living in poverty […] 
while the countries’ leaders may be diverting millions from national wealth to Swiss bank 
accounts for their personal benefit” (Ferguson, 2017) The book addresses the link between 
corruption and poverty, which is strong, but as many others have he only mentions inequality as 
something that is, along with poverty, exacerbated by corruption. In order to understand 
corruption, the role of inequality must be understood, and not confused with poverty as elements 
of the same phenomena (e.g., Ünver & Koyuncu, 2016).  
 
3.1.2 Causes of Corruption 
Research on the causes of corruption has provided many possible causes with varying degrees of 
explanatory power and significance. The causal directions, indirect effects and causal relations of 
these variables are mapped in a steadily increasing number of studies. Yet isolating variables that 
cause corruption is challenging because many are themselves affected by corruption.  
 
In the broader corruption research, there is a strong focus on institutional causes. When 
corruption is considered a sign of bad government, it makes sense to think that improving the 
institutions will improve the situation. A more responsive and transparent government, the 
thinking goes, works against corruption by design. Therefore, structural reform should cause 
levels of corruption to decrease (see e.g., Graf Lambsdorff, 2005; Rose-Ackerman, 2004; 
Søreide, 2014). But institutional quality or type alone cannot explain the level of corruption. 
Uslaner (2005) lists four challenges that institutional explanations face. 1) Internal consistency, 
in that both centralized and decentralized power can facilitate corruption. 2) Institutions are 
products of their cultures. Nearly 60 percent of countries with Presidential systems with closed 
party lists are in South America or in former communist countries, possibly reflecting the low 
levels of trust. 3) A long-term fight against corruption requires an institutional culture that can 
continue even when the media loses interest and politicians actively work against it. 4) 




As mentioned above, research on corruption has revealed many correlates of corruption. In this 
paper, it is the potential link between inequality and corruption that is of interest. Yet any paper 
dealing with the causes or consequences of corruption should include a short review of the 
literature on corruption and economic development3. This is especially true for a paper focusing 
on inequality, a term that is closely related to, and sometimes confused with, economic 
development.  
 
There is no agreement on the main direction of causality, but there is general agreement in the 
literature reviewed that the strongest and most consistent finding of research in the last two 
decades is that higher economic development correlates closely with lower perceived corruption 
(Chetwynd et al., 2003; Treisman, 2007, p. 223). In Ünver and Koyuncu’s analysis of 154 
countries with data from the period 2000 to 2013, they found that “corruption is strongly and 
positively influenced by poverty” (Ünver & Koyuncu, 2016). The strength of the correlation 
holds true even for levels of GDP per capita in 1820 and 1900 (Treisman, 2007). Treisman also 
finds that the correlation survives the inclusion of control variables for democracy, trade, 
inequality, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, latitude, religion, culture, inflation, various policy 
variables and region. Only the variables for democracy and press freedom attenuated the effect 
of GDP per capita on corruption to a significant degree.  
 
Yet the answer to why there exists a relation does not have a definitive answer or consensus. 
Despite the many studies showing a strong correlation between GDP per capita and corruption, 
the effect should be understood as being mainly indirect4. For corruption to have a direct effect 
                                                 
3 This relationship has been attempted modeled before, most famously in the Kuznets curve. But the Kuznets curve 
is not included because of Piketty’s (Piketty, 2006), Acemoglu’s (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2002) and Kuznets’ own 
criticism of its use. As Kusnets himself wrote: “This is perhaps 5 per cent empirical information and 95 per cent 
speculation, some of it possibly tainted by wishful thinking” (Kuznets, 1955).  
4 Ünver and Koyuncu (2016) find that countries with a higher poverty level experience higher levels of corruption, 
this corresponds to findings in other studies. However, their use of measurements for the poverty variable is not 
common in the literature reviewed for this thesis. To represent poverty, they include five variables: the UN’s Human 
Development Index (HDI), which is a composite index of several variables; the WB’s GINI coefficient, which is a 
measurement of income inequality; the WB’s mean log deviation (MLD), which is another measure of income 
inequality; the World Bank’s Headcount, which measures the percentage of a population living below the poverty 
line; and the WB’s Watts’ poverty index. By including a composite index as well as two inequality variables in their 





on GDP per capita at a country-level, money and other values must be siphoned off from the 
many various economic activities that make up the gross value of domestic output. This is 
conceivable in countries with a very low GDP output and in countries where a few individuals 
control large parts of the economy and/or state apparatuses. How GDP per capita can have a 
direct effect on the levels of corruption is more difficult to think of and the literature did not 
provide many examples. The one factor that can explain a direct effect is the bias towards poorer 
countries among the experts participating in a survey-based index of corruption, such as 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. But this does not explain the 
correlation to indexes of corruption that do not include foreign “experts” or those that do not 
include surveys at all.  
3.2 INEQUALITY 
3.2.1 Consequences of Inequality 
The detrimental consequences of inequality are many. Some of the detrimental effects of 
inequality include poor educational performance, violence and low levels of wellbeing, health 
and trust (Stephany, 2017). At its worst, economic and social stratification of a society can lead 
to anomie, in which people experience society as unpredictable and without order and normative 
constraints lose strength. In such a society, a sense of futility and unfairness will be more 
prevalent (Ariely & Uslaner, 2017). This can lead to higher levels of crime, including corruption 
(Zhang et al., 2009). And although the definitions may vary, corruption is considered a crime in 
most countries. It is therefore interesting to investigate the criminal consequences of inequality.  
 
Ecological theories of crime look at the differing incentives, pressures and deterrents that 
individuals face in different environments (communities and societies) that explain variations in 
levels of crime. Three of the most influential ecological theories of crime in sociology - social 
disorganization theory, the strain theory and the economic theory – predict that inequality 
increases crime (Kelly, 2000).  
 
When talking about crime it is natural to talk about violence. Homicide-rates, in particular, are 
oft-cited examples of violence (Wood, 2006). Additionally, there are many studies that tie 
inequality to several specific sub-categories of violence such as ethnonationalist civil war, 
18 
 
insurgencies and domestic violence (Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011; Fearon & Laitin, 
2003; Sanz-Barbero et al., 2015).  
 
Morgan Kelly (2000), perhaps a bit counter-intuitively, finds that while there are strong 
correlations between violent crime and inequality, no such correlation exists for property crime 
and inequality. Phrased differently, crimes with economic incentives are impacted mainly by 
poverty while crimes of passion are inexorably linked to inequality and the associated social 
disorganization. This has some implication for the thesis. If corruption is more of a property 
crime than a violent crime, then in Kelly’s model of crime and economy it should not correlate 
with inequality, but rather with poverty. There are two points that need to be considered before 
accepting the model’s relevancy to the thesis. Firstly, it is a criminological model originating in 
studies on urban areas in the US. However, this does not negate the potential for generalization 
to a global level. Secondly, Kelly did not include corruption in his examples of property crime. 
Yet, when considering that corruption is linked to rational and economic incentives, corruption 
can be considered as within the sphere of property crime.  
3.2.2 Inequality as a Cause to Corruption 
Research on the correlation between inequality and corruption has often examined how 
corruption causes inequality (Batabyal & Chowdhury, 2015; Chetwynd et al., 2003; Gupta et al., 
1998; Treisman, 2007). As to the possibility of the reverse direction of causality – that inequality 
has a causal effect on corruption – there is an increasing amount of research. A few of these even 
build on regression analysis on global datasets (e.g., J.-S. You & Khagram, 2005; J. S. You, 
2012; Zhang et al., 2009). Their positive findings indicate a correlation between inequality and 
corruption, but this does not determine the direction of causation.  
 
Uslaner finds that the fairness of the legal system has both indirect and direct effects on 
corruption: “The only institutional variable that matters is the fairness of the legal system, the 
perception (of elites from the Economist Intelligence Unit) that the rich and the poor receive 
equal treatment under the law. This, of course, is a form of inequality more than it is of legal 




Jong-Sung You and Sanjeev Khagram (2005) argue that inequality should be considered as 
equally important in increasing corruption as economic development is. Their main argument is 
that through material and normative mechanisms, inequality is socially conducive to high levels 
of corruption. In a very unequal society, the rich will own a disproportionally large part of the 
wealth and political influence. To avoid losing this they will work against perceived threats and 
chief among these are fair political, administrative and judicial processes. Undermining legal 
processes carries great potential reward for those who can afford it. In such a society the barriers 
to participation will be higher and the poor will see their influence, beyond the vote, decrease. 
This phenomenon is called state capture and concerns itself with economic inequality and, as a 
result, with inequality of influence (Dutta & Mishra, 2013). The poor cannot afford the bribes of 
the rich and lack the resources to organize effective political campaigns and push for methods of 
monitoring corruption. More so than the rich, the poor and middle classes are dependent on the 
functioning state apparatus as they cannot afford to circumvent it. To increase the chances of 
receiving certain services and goods, as well as avoiding certain taxes, many will resort to petty 
corruption and bribes (J.-S. You & Khagram, 2005).  
 
Indranil Dutta and Ajit Mishra (2013) look at inequality and corruption from an economics 
perspective. They link corruption in one market, or sector, to inequality and resulting 
imperfections in related markets. Informal markets have a higher number of less productive 
firms, and they contend that less productive firms are under certain conditions more likely to be 
corrupt. When outside the regulated market, firms can afford to be less productive as the legal 
requirements and regulations for production and quality are easily ignored. Although they 
generally do not have access to the loans, investments and legal protections of their competitors 
in the legal market, the boundaries between the informal and formal markets blur when 
government inspectors and monitors can be bribed (E. Dabla-Norris & Inchauste, 2008). By 
bribing their way out of taxes and regulations corrupt firms can compete in the formal market. 
An increase in the number of these firms in a market increases the level of corruption by forcing 
the departure of productive, law-abiding firms (Dutta & Mishra, 2013).  
 
Zhang et al. (2009) argue in their study that income inequality fosters corruption indirectly 
through reduced social support and reduced human development. They look at causes of 
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corruption from a criminological viewpoint and include social support theory in their analysis. 
Social support is something positive that can prevent or lessen occurrences of crime. In their 
study they define social support as “the willingness of governments to commit scarce resources 
to the aid and comfort of their residents” (Zhang et al., 2009, p. 208) and have measured it as 
public expenditure on healthcare5. As found in several other studies, the Gini index has no direct 
effect on corruption, but they do find that it has a robust, moderate indirect effect through social 
support and human development. In his review of corruption studies, Treisman (2007) also did 
not find support for a strong correlation between inequality and corruption.  
 
The literature supports a correlation between inequality and corruption, but it is contingent on an 
intermediary.  
3.3 COMPLEX RELATIONSHIPS: INEQUALITY, TRUST AND CORRUPTION 
3.3.1 Inequality to Trust 
In “All for All”, Rothstein and Uslaner argue that inequality is causally prior to generalized trust, 
saying that generalized trust “both depends upon a foundation of economic and social equality 
and contributes to the development of a more egalitarian society” (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005, p. 
45). Equality of opportunity implies the application of fair rules and strong supporting structures, 
enabling among other things social mobility. Universal programs, such as universal healthcare 
and free public education, are associated with the rights of all citizens and not only a few groups. 
In contrast to means-tested social programs - where the beneficiary has to prove the need for aid, 
sometimes on a regular basis - universal social programs increase social trust through a more 
general and transparent redistribution of wealth. Equality of opportunity and equality of income 
correlate with a sense of optimism for a shared future, which in turn makes trusting strangers 
easier. The opposite should be true for strong hierarchical societies stratified by class or caste 
where particularized trust is strong: 
“Where there is a dearth of social solidarity due to class envy, the social bonds of 
generalized trust will be weak, and so will the propensity (especially from the middle 
                                                 
5 This is similar to Rothstein and Uslaner’s definition of equality of opportunity as public policies intending to create 
equal conditions for citizens (see section 2.2). 
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class) to pay high taxes. People will identify more with their class or ethnic group (or 
both) than with members of the larger society.” - (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005, p. 55)  
 
By looking at levels of generalized trust and age- and education-specific measures of income 
inequality in 22 countries, Fabian Stephany (2017) finds inequality to be an important indicator 
of the level of trust6. He also finds that all countries, independent of GDP per capita, have age-
specific income imbalances that decrease trust, especially in countries with generally high 
inequality. Stratification and the perception of inequality are two concepts that he argues are 
important to explaining how inequality leads to low trust. When societies become more unequal, 
or stratified, separate spheres of daily life emerge. In the end, large differences between in-
groups and out-groups will act as barriers to trust. Perception of inequality is primarily made by 
socio-economic benchmarking and does not measure the actual level of inequality (Stephany, 
2017). Importantly, this also works the other way around, economic measures of inequality do 
not measure perception of inequality - which should be an important factor in the level of trust. 
When people do not perceive society to have a shared fate, due to the economic differences in a 
stratified society, they will lose trust in out-groups, i.e. most people. The group that we compare 
ourselves with depends on many factors, but it also changes as we age. The link between 
inequality and trust should be different for a 20 year-old, who socializes with and compares 
themselves to peers who have recently moved from home for the first time and just started work 
or studies, and most 80 year-olds, who traditionally socialize with family and a smaller group of 
friends.  
 
You (2012) argues that generalized trust is negatively affected by inequality through a sense of 
unfairness, rather than a sense of difference. He uses Rawls’ justice as fairness concept to argue 
that fair distributive, procedural and formal justice leads to higher levels of trust. The 
measurements of these theoretical variables are “corruption (breach of formal justice), 
democracy (procedural justice), and income distribution (distributive justice)” (J. S. You, 2012, 
p. 703). Inequality might also violate a culture’s norm of distribution, which regulate “what is 
seen as a fair allocation of income or other goods” (Elster, 1989, p. 101). Smerdon and Blauw 
                                                 
6 His methodology shows the interesting results that this kind of research offers. By looking closer at sub-national 
patterns of inequality he shows the importance of including such complimentary measurements to the standard 
cross-national aggregated measures, that alone do not capture or explain the deeper patterns within a society.  
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find that the distribution of income and the process behind it is important: “that inequality’s 
effect on trust is strongest when income is randomly allocated, is consistent with Uslaner’s 
(2002) well-established theory of the psychological foundations of trust” (Smerdon & Blauw, 
2017, p. 23).  
 
According to You (J. S. You, 2012), rich people generally think they are justly rewarded while 
poor people are more prone to think they are unjustly under-rewarded. Gould finds that in many 
advanced countries the increase in income inequality in the last two decades has led to increased 
social gaps in society and that overall “inequality seems to reduce an individual’s sense of trust, 
fairness, and helpfulness in others, and this finding is rather consistent across gender and 
education groups” (Gould & Hijzen, 2016). In the United States, inequality at the bottom reduces 
trust mainly for those who are impacted by this inequality, less educated people and those in the 
lower third of the income distribution. In Europe however, inequality at the bottom leads to a 
general reduction of trust among a broader section of society, including those who are not 
directly impacted by inequality. Despite the differences, the results suggest inequality at the 
bottom of the distribution lowers the level of trust in others, both in the United States and in 
Europe (Gould & Hijzen, 2016).  
3.3.2 Trust to Corruption 
In nearly all human interactions trust is involved. When humans successfully cooperate, this is a 
result of trust. When cooperation is not certain to be successful, the social sciences provide us 
with many metaphors: the prisoner’s dilemma, the provision of public goods, the problem of 
collective action, and the tragedy of the commons (Uslaner, 2013a). Rawls explains the causal 
link:  
“For although men know that they share a common sense of justice and that each wants 
to adhere to existing arrangements, they may nevertheless lack full confidence in one 
another. They may suspect that some are not doing their part, and so they may be 
tempted not to do theirs. The general awareness of these temptations may eventually 
cause the scheme to break down. The suspicion that others are not honoring their duties 
and obligations is increased by the fact that, in absence of the authoritative interpretation 
and enforcement of the rules, it is particularly easy to find excuses for breaking them.” – 




In other words, a culture of mistrust increases the level of perceived trust-violations, such as 
corruption, which in turn leads more people to not honor their duties and obligations. Findings 
from several cross-national studies using aggregate data lend empirical support to this view: “a 
lack of trust […] prevents the adoption of a universalistic ethos and cooperative behavior and 
favors instead instrumental and individualistic approaches to problems” (Morris & Klesner, 
2010). If cooperation is costly to all parties in the short run but rewarding in the long run, trust is 
integral to keeping agents on-board. Without trust, the likelihood of agents reneging on their 
commitment increases.  
 
Individuals “form their system of beliefs from the imperfect information available to them” 
(Rothstein, 2011, p. 173). The hearsay, rumors, collective narratives and personal experiences 
that are a part of this imperfect information affects both the perceived and real prevalence of 
corruption. Survey respondents will answer surveys based on the perceived prevalence of 
corruption, just as many of those participating in corruption will justify their behavior by the 
perceived high level of corruption: “everyone else is doing it” (Rose‐Ackerman, 2001). A 
perception of corruption, both high-level and petty, is linked to lower levels of generalized trust 
(Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). 
3.3.3 Inequality to corruption via trust 
As Eric M. Uslaner writes in The Moral Foundations of Trust: “Countries with more trusters 
have better functioning government, more redistributive policies, more open markets, and less 
corruption. What distinguishes countries that are trusting from those that are not is the level of 
economic equality” (Uslaner, 2002). The opposite of this, high inequality and low levels of trust, 
can ultimately lead to a view that “society is a zero-sum game between conflicting groups” 
(Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005, p. 46). You and Khagram argue that people in unequal societies are 
more likely to consider political institutions and rules as favoring the rich and as lacking 
legitimacy. People are more likely to circumvent laws and regulations when they are considered 
illegitimate (J.-S. You & Khagram, 2005, p. 139).  
 
Several studies support what can be termed an inequality trap, where inequality, trust and 
corruption are viewed as mutually reinforcing (e.g., Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Uslaner, 2005; J. 
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S. You, 2012). Inequality leads to lower trust, which leads to higher levels of corruption, which 
in turn leads to more inequality (Uslaner, 2013a): 
High inequality −> low trust −> high corruption −> high inequality 
Each persists over long periods of time and countries face serious difficulties in escaping this 
trap - either to advance upward or to fall downward (Uslaner, 2005). If the persistent stickiness 
of corruption is not explained by institutional changes very well, the argument of corruption 
being a bottom-up phenomenon is strengthened.  
 
Inequality, low levels of trust and corruption all undermine the ideals of what John Rawls called 
the well-ordered society, a society in which “everyone accepts and know that the others accept 
the same principles of justice, and the basic social institutions satisfy and are known to satisfy 
these principles” (Uslaner, 2005).  
 
3.3.3.1 A note on regional dynamics 
Latin American countries, countries with socialist legal origins and Eastern European countries 
are in several studies (e.g., Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Uslaner, 2005; J.-S. You & Khagram, 
2005) held as examples of regions where the dynamic of the inequality trap is weakened7. You 
and Khagram (2005) and Uslaner (2002) found countries with a socialist legal origin to have a 
significantly more equal income distribution than others while at the same time being 
significantly more corrupt. The different dynamics are considered a result of the socialist legacy; 
despite scoring low on inequality, 80 percent in Bulgaria, Hungary and Russia believe that high 
incomes are a result of dishonesty (Uslaner, 2005). Similarly low levels of trust are normally 
only seen in countries with high inequality. You and Khagram warn that “failure to consider 
different conditions between socialist and nonsocialist legal origins obscures the effect of 
inequality on corruption” (J.-S. You & Khagram, 2005, p. 146). 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that Latin American and Eastern European countries comprise 38 percent of the sample. 
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3.4 SUMMARY AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
As shown in the discussion above the links between inequality, corruption and trust have been 
the subject of academic inquiries before. Central authors like Rothstein, Uslaner and You all see 
inequality through trust as an important causal model for corruption. Challenging this 
understanding is some of the literature on inequality and crime. That inequality leads to social 
ills is not challenged. Kelly finds that social disorganization and alienation are inexorably linked 
to inequality, and certain types of crime are as well. Property crime, or economic crime, 
however, is not found to be explained by inequality. The idea that property crime is linked to 
rational, economic incentives and that violent crime is linked to anomie and social 
disorganization contradicts the trust centered models of Rothstein, Uslaner and You. Yet all 
seem to receive support from the data.  
 
Rothstein, Uslaner and You favor complex theories focusing on structural and normative 
explanations, but the trust-centered model could be an overly complicated model for what might 
turn out to be a simpler causal dynamic, or none at all. If Kelly is right, then there should be no 
correlation from inequality to corruption. Yet if there is a correlation, it does not disprove 
Kelly’s theory, but rather provides further evidence of why corruption is a special case.  
 
In order to investigate these issues, my research question is:  
 





4 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Answering the research question will be a small addition to the growing literature on the 
relations between inequality, corruption and trust. In order to answer the research question, I will 
generate testable hypotheses based on the theories and assumptions presented in the literature 
review.  
 
Below is the model of causality in my hypotheses. The hypothesized causal link from income 
inequality to corruption is much stronger when it is indirect through trust. This is represented 
with thicker arrows than that of the direct effect of income inequality to corruption.  
 










Hypothesis 1:  
The first part of the research question asks Does inequality have an effect on corruption. Much 
of the literature, as presented in sections 3.3.3, supports a link between inequality and corruption. 
Even if much of the effect is indirect through trust, it will show as a direct relationship from 
income inequality to corruption, also when trust is in the model. Accordingly, my first 
hypothesis is:  
Higher levels of income inequality lead to higher levels of corruption  
 
Hypothesis 2:  
The second part of the research question asks whether the relationship between inequality and 








corruption. The literature tends to support the argument that low trust societies experience higher 
levels of corruption, as presented in sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3. Cooperation and adherence to a 
common sense of justice suffers where there is distrust. A culture of mistrust increases the level 
of perceived corruption, which in turn might increase the actual level of corruption. In other 
words, the conditions required for John Rawls’ well-ordered society to function are absent in a 
low trust society: “a lack of trust […] prevents the adoption of a universalistic ethos and 
cooperative behavior and favors instead instrumental and individualistic approaches to 
problems” (Morris & Klesner, 2010). Following this, my second hypothesis is:  
Trust is a significant variable in explaining corruption 
 
 
Hypothesis 3:  
The other hypotheses above cover individual relations in the research question. H3 covers the 
causal relations from inequality to corruption, via trust. In section 3.3.3, theories pertaining to 
this link were presented. The inequality trap describes the causal relations between the three 
variables. Additionally, several studies by other researchers, such as Rothstein, Ariely and You, 
have found support for this causal chain. Considering the strong theoretical support for the casual 
relations between the three variables, resulting in the other hypotheses, I expect H3 to be true:  








In this chapter I will present the data used in this thesis. Additionally, I will discuss the variables’ 
measurements, sources and their validity to the theoretical phenomenon I wish to investigate.  
 
The dataset in this thesis was created with data from three datasets. The Quality of Government 
Standard Dataset, version jan2018 (Teorell et al., 2018) was the main dataset, but several 
variables are from the 2019 and 2016 datasets (Teorell et al., 2019; Teorell et al., 2016). The 
2018 Quality of Government dataset (2018 QoG dataset) includes data from and around 2014. If 
a country does not have data for 2014, data for 2015 is included. If there is no data for 2015, data 
for 2013 is included, this continues up to a maximum of any +/- 3 years. In other words, data for 
2014 is prioritized but where this is missing the dataset includes data from the closest year, 
ranging from 2011 to 2017. The same system applies to the 2019 and 2016 datasets, but with the 
years 2015 and 2012 as the starting point.  
5.1 CHOICE OF UNITS 
The units in this thesis are countries. This is limited by the number of countries included for the 
selected variables in the QoG datasets. By including as many units as possible, selection bias is 
avoided, external validity is strengthened, and the validity of a generalization increases.  
5.1.1 Data: single year or averaged 
Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) and You and Khagram {, 2005 #11) write about the stickiness 
problem of corruption, trust and inequality: they rarely change much over time. Because of this, 
and to reduce measurement errors, You and Khagram {, 2005 #11) use averaged inequality data 
for the years 1971-1996. Although averaging data might increase the accuracy of estimates, 
benefits are offset by ignoring intertemporal variations. Further discussions of sample quality 





As there is no way of accurately measuring the level of corruption, indexes with data from 
multiple surveys represent the best method - such as TI’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
(Transparency International, 2018a). However, one issue with survey-based ratings is the risk for 
systemic bias and measurement error in the data. Survey respondents will always have subjective 
and possibly biased judgements. Survey answers may be biased by social desirability effects, 
where respondents answer what they believe is socially desirable and not what they have 
experienced (Justesen & Bjørnskov, 2014). As the CPI is an index of the perception of 
corruption, it avoids some of the problems that experience-based surveys might have, such as in 
countries where reporting on corruption might lead to negative consequences. However, there is 
good reason to ask whether surveys measure the countries’ corruption levels or the countries’ 
reputations, influenced by media coverage, stereotypes and rumors. In a review on the causes of 
corruption, Treisman (2014) finds that numerous studies show a discrepancy between expert and 
popular evaluations of the level of corruption, with experts more likely to overestimate the extent 
of corruption, especially in low income countries. Exports from richer countries might be 
negatively biased towards poorer countries, resulting in a stronger correlation between corruption 
and poverty than is true. Despite this, the CPI index is the most widely used indicator of 
corruption. And although there are some issues relating to the reliability of its data, the CPI 
correlates well with more objective indicators of corruption, such as citizen experiences with 
bribery (Transparency International, 2018b).  
 
As mentioned in section 2.3, TI’s definition of corruption is “the abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain”. The CPI measures the perception among experts and business executives of 
corruption in the public sector by combining data from 13 surveys from 12 independent 
institutions. The scale goes from 0 (highest level of perceived corruption) to 100 (lowest level of 
perceived corruption). By using the average of at least three sources, potential errors in the 
individual surveys are compensated for. Another benefit of this composite index is that different 
manifestations and dimensions of public sector corruption are reconciled into one indicator 
(Transparency International, 2018b). Depending on the source data, the surveys capture many 
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different aspects of corruption, see appendix B, section 11.1 for more information on this. They 
write that the CPI does not capture “citizen perceptions or experience of corruption”, but the 
experts providing answers to the survey are also citizens. Although the experts are experts in 
their field and far more knowledgeable than the average person, they are also subject to cultural 
norms, political and religious ideologies and prejudice. They, just as other citizens, “form their 
system of beliefs from the imperfect information available to them” (Rothstein, 2011, p. 173).  
 
Additional measures of corruption are the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) by Transparency 
International and the Public Sector Corruption Index and the Political Corruption Index by the 
Varieties of Democracy Project8. Each measurement provides benefits the others do not have, 
but the CPI has some strengths the others do not have. Unlike the World Bank’s Control of 
Corruption, which uses different surveys measuring different aspects of corruption, the CPI 
measures aspects of corruption in line with the definition the abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain. Use of the same methodology for all countries provides quantifiable indicators. 
This is a reason for its popularity and by using the CPI it will be easier to compare the results of 
this study to those of other studies.  
 
The CPI data in the regression is from the 2019 Quality of Government dataset (Teorell et al., 
2019) and covers 178 countries with observations ranging from 2014 to 2017.  
 
A histogram of the variable revealed that it was not normally distributed. According to 
econometric literature a logarithmic transformation is recommended. Following this a natural 
logarithmic transformation was performed on the variable, with good effect.  
 
5.2.2 Inequality 
To measure income inequality, I will use the World Bank’s Gini Index from the 2019 QoG 
dataset. This index is widely used, and the data is easily available. Data is not available for every 
country in every year and is one of the weaknesses of using a single year. If I were to use data 
                                                 
8 When both are run as independent variables against the natural logarithm of CPI’s corruption variable, the adjusted 
R2 is 0.728 and the Variance inflation Factor (VIF) for both is 10.382 (see section 10.5.1). All three variables are 
from the 2019 QoG dataset (Teorell et al., 2019).  
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from a 10-year period, 2008-2017, the number of countries would increase. However, using Gini 
measures from 10 years prior to data for other variables might be problematic for investigating 
correlations.  
 
The main weakness of the Gini coefficient is that it ignores different kinds of inequality. The 
Gini coefficient is less sensitive to inequalities in the bottom and top parts of the income 
distribution and most sensitive to the middle part (De Maio, 2007). In a global comparison of 
inequality, the different kinds of inequality should be of statistical and theoretical interest and 
importance. This is especially relevant for an investigation of its effect on trust: “Different 
measures of inequality will capture different mechanisms through which inequality may 
influence trust” (Jordahl, 2007, p. 8). De Maio argues that the GINI coefficient is best seen as 
one of many options for operationalizing income inequality.  
 
Despite the above-mentioned weaknesses of the Gini index, I have chosen to use it for several 
reasons. All indexes of income inequality are attempts at a currently impossible feat: quantifying 
a pattern of income among a certain number of individuals, all while lacking both a mathematical 
definition of inequality and access to all the data. The lack of complete data is due to the, and 
quite understandable, absence of a universal ledger that records and stores every individual’s 
official and unofficial income. The mathematical definition of inequality should be much easier 
to produce, but the large number of inequality indexes proves that we have not yet arrived at an 
agreement on a universal definition, and much less its estimate (Kokko et al., 1999). The Gini 
index overcomes these challenges by measuring easily accessible data according to a simple 
method, the Lorenz curve. In a graph showing complete income equality, with the cumulative 
proportion of population on the horizontal axis and the cumulative proportion of income on the 
vertical axis, there would be a 45-degree line going from the lower left corner to the upper right 
corner, where the poorest 1% earn 1% of the income, the poorest 20% earn 20% of the income, 
and so on. The Lorenz curve plots the actual distribution of income. Visually, the Gini 
coefficient is defined by the area between the diagonal 45-degree line and the Lorenz curve 
(McKay, 2002). Thus, the Gini index is expressed as the percentage that this area covers of the 




The measure for inequality is the World Bank’s Gini index as found in the 2019 Quality of 
Government dataset (Teorell et al., 2019, p. 693) and covers 114 countries with observations 
ranging from 2012 to 2017.  
5.2.2.1 Equality of Opportunity 
In addition to inequality of outcomes, of which income inequality is one measure, there is 
inequality of opportunity. According to Rothstein and Uslaner, inequality of opportunity can be 
measured by policies that intend “to create equal conditions for citizens regardless of their 
income, ethnic/religious background, sex, and race in areas such as health care, education, and 
social security and legal protection ("equality before the law") (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005)”. 
They argue that unequal access to opportunity for different groups in society is another important 
measure of inequality – which is also correlated to mistrust and corruption. This is a very 
interesting aspect of inequality and a variable measuring this would be a good addition to my 
model. The Bertelsmann Tranformation Index (Teorell et al., 2018) includes a variable called 
Equality of Opportunity, but as the index only covers developing and transition countries it 
excludes a majority of developed countries. This will further decrease the sample of countries 
and will be of little use in a global comparative study.  
 
5.2.3 Trust 
Generalized trust is the belief that most people can be trusted. Surveys like the World Values 
Survey (WVS), European Values Study (EVS) and European Social Survey (ESS) measure 
levels of generalized trust with the statements Most people can be trusted correlating to high 
generalized trust and Needs to be very careful corresponding to low generalized trust. Trust can 
also be measured with the question Generally speaking, do you believe that most people can be 
trusted or can’t you be too careful in dealing with people? The question does not mention 
context and it asks respondents for their views on most people, which most respondents will 
understand includes a variety of people in their society (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005).  
 
Trust can be viewed as a measurement of survey respondents’ “assessment of the moral standard 
of society”, their sense of social solidarity and belief that the citizens of their country share a 
shared fate (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005, p. 42). When viewed as a measurement of people’s 
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evaluation of the moral standard of a society, it is easy to see the importance it plays in what an 
individual considers acceptable behavior9.  
 
There are limits however to what a single question can measure, especially concerning such an 
intricate and non-tangible term as trust. The term most people is vague and subjective. People 
distinguish others into two groups of social interactions and trust, in-group and out-group. Most 
people refers to the out-group, but the radius of social interactions varies according to cultures. 
For example, in Confucian countries the radius is narrow while in wealthy countries and 
European countries it is wider (Stephany, 2017). This poses a challenge, however, for cross-
national comparisons. If the question is interpreted differently, how can we compare generalized 
trust in two different countries? Several studies (e.g., Delhey, Newton, & Welzel, 2011; Glaeser 
et al., 2000; Stephany, 2017) have found that the ambiguity of the question is its strength. If the 
term is culturally defined the variation should be low.  
 
The measure for Trust is the Human Understanding Measured Across National (HUMAN) 
Surveys’ Social Trust variable as found in the 2019 Quality of Government dataset (Teorell et 
al., 2019, p. 367) and covers 109 countries with observations ranging from 2012 to 2016. The 
HUMAN survey combines public opinion data from 19 surveys and averages the scores to create 
unique country-year observations. The score ranges from 0, the lowest possible level of trust, to 
100, the highest.  
 
5.2.4 Control variables 
In the studies reviewed for this paper, all regressions included several control variables. By 
including theoretically and empirically relevant control variables we can control for their effect 
on variables in the model, thereby avoiding both specification bias and underspecifying the 
model (Kolnes, 2016; Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2012). At the same time, I do not wish to include 
irrelevant variables as they generally increase the variances of the other independent variables 
due to multicollinearity (Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2012). This problem is referred to as overfitting 
                                                 
9A study by Glaeser et al. (2000) combined two experiments and a survey and found that the question about trust is 




or overspecifying the model. As the causal direction cannot be known, including variables that 
are not directly relevant to my model is of questionable benefit. When related variables that are 
not directly relevant to the model are included, the R square (R2) increases near-automatically 
and won’t decrease even when an irrelevant variable is added. Before including any control 
variables, I will consider their theoretical and empirical importance and avoid conceptual- and 
measurement overlap. An additional consideration when including a new variable is the number 
of observations. Most variables considered for the regression have observations around 100, with 
trust having the lowest number of 8810. The issue of sample quality and data availability is 
discussed further in section 6.3.  
 
5.2.4.1 Economic Development 
The attention economic development receives in studies is understandable when considering the 
many consequences of poverty, such as poor health, high levels of crime and low levels of 
education (C. Kellogg, 2018). Due to the importance of economic development in the corruption 
literature (see section 3.1.2) I believe it will be interesting and enlightening to include economic 
development as a control variable.  
 
In the literature, Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP per capita) is the standard measure of 
the level of economic development (e.g., Lučić, Radišić, & Dobromirov, 2016; Treisman, 2014; 
J.-S. You & Khagram, 2005). Following this, GDP per capita will be the measurement of 
economic development. Bias from government estimates and definitions of poverty is avoided.  
 
The data is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, as in the 2018 QoG dataset, 
and covers the years 2011 to 2014 and N=190. GDP per capita is the gross domestic product 
divided by the country’s midyear population. It is the sum of the gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy and all product taxes, minus subsidies not included in the 
value of the products. Data are in current US dollars (Teorell et al., 2018, p. 656).  
 
                                                 
10 At one point in the data preparation the number of observations across all variables was eight. Meaning that only 
eight countries would be included in the analysis. This is a significant limiting factor and a reason for including 
fewer variables that measure larger dynamics.  
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A histogram of the variable revealed that it was not normally distributed. Following econometric 
literature, a logarithmic transformation was performed. This is quite common in corruption 
studies where GDP per capita is included (e.g., Treisman, 2014; J.-S. You & Khagram, 2005).  
 
5.2.4.2  Democracy  
In studies on corruption, democracy is often included as an institutional variable. Democracies, 
the reasoning goes, protect civil liberties, such as free speech, and nurture an independent press 
and public institutions, such as the judiciary. This should result in an independent judiciary 
continuously fighting corruption as well as protecting the right of the press to expose corrupt 
practices (Zhang et al., 2009). Following this reasoning, several studies on corruption have 
included democracy and a score for the independence of the judiciary as control variables. Some 
research has shown that for democracy to have an impact on corruption and trust, it must be 
long-term and stable. On trust, one study found that democracy has a negative effect for 
countries below the mean score of democracy and a positive effect for higher scores. This is 
supported by Uslaner, who finds that only after 46 years of continuous democracy does 
democracy produce a positive effect on trust, and that it has a negative effect in the beginning (J. 
S. You, 2012). The same has been found for the duration of democracy on corruption (Treisman, 
2000, 2007). A recent study found that democracy reduces corruption only in countries with a 
GDP per capita of above 2000 USD (Jetter, Agudelo, & Hassan, 2015). The importance of both 
the duration of democracy as well as income per capita finds support in another study (Rock, 
2009), but the number of years before a democracy has a positive effect on corruption is between 
ten to twelve years, significantly lower than what the findings of Uslaner and Treisman suggest.  
 
To make my thesis more readily comparable with other studies, I have chosen to measure 
democracies with one single variable. Based on Polity IV’s own categorization, I created a 
dummy variable that contains all countries with a score of seven or higher. According to Polity 
IV’s Dataset User’s Manual, all countries with a score of seven or higher are full democracies 
(Marshall, 2018, p. 35). A high score entails a well-functioning democracy and should weigh up 




5.2.4.3 Rule of Law 
 
In addition to democracy it will be beneficial to include a measure of institutional and 
governance quality. Of interest is the independence of the judiciary, respect for property rights, 
contract enforceability and the extent to which people abide by the rules of society and consider 
their enforcement predictable. There are many variables that measure each individual factor and 
variables that include many. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter (see section 5.2.4), 
including variables that do not have observations for a large number of countries will result in a 
lower total number of observations that can be used in the regression. The Rule of Law is an 
aggregate indicator on the extent to which a society is successful in “developing an environment 
in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions and the 
extent to which property rights are protected” (Teorell et al., 2018, p. 625).  
 
The disadvantage of subjective variables, which comprise the Rule of Law variable, is the 
conceptual overlap with the perception of corruption. This is something that Treisman also noted 
in his review of literature on the causes of corruption (Treisman, 2007). The independence of the 
judiciary or the predictable enforcement of the law are conceptually quite similar to the 
measurement of corruption, whether there is “abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. Despite 
this overlap, the analysis will benefit from this variable. However, due to a very high VIF and in 
order to control for the effect of low rule of law, I have created a dummy variable (see section 
10.4) where a score above the median is 0 and a score on or below the median is 1.  
 
The data is from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, as in the 2018 QoG 
dataset, with 194 countries covering the years 2013 to 2014.  
 
5.2.4.4 HDI 
In addition to GDP per capita, the Human Development Index (HDI) can function as a second 
and different measure of development. A high HDI score indicates a high level of human 
development. The HDI includes three key dimensions of human development: the health 
dimension, measured by life expectancy at birth; the education dimension, measured by expected 
years of education for children starting school and the average years of education among those 
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25 years and older; and the standard of living, measured by gross national income per capita 
(GNI). The HDI is the geometric mean of the normalized indices. Although closely related to 
GDP, GNI includes net wages, salaries, property income, taxes and subsidies received from 
abroad (OECD, 2019). As an example, due to the high number of foreign companies in Ireland, 
the GNI in 2016 was nearly 30% lower than the GDP (Boland, 2017). Most countries do not 
experience this extreme difference, but many people in poor and middle-income countries rely 
on remittances that are included in GNI, but not GDP. And importantly, because the importance 
of income diminishes with an increasing GNI, the HDI uses the natural logarithm of income 
(Teorell et al., 2018, p. 589).  
 
Previous research has shown that high levels of corruption are correlated to lower adult literacy 
rates, higher infant mortality rates, lower expenditures on education and higher dropout rates in 
primary schools (J.-S. You, 2006). And from the sections above, it is easy to understand these 
variables’ theoretical relevance and correlation to inequality, trust and GDP per capita.  
 
To capture the link between low human development and corruption I have created a 
dichotomous dummy variable. The country groupings are according to UNDP’s cutoff points 
presented in the Technical Notes to the Human Development Report (UNDP, 2018). Countries 
with a score of 0.69 or lower are considered less developed and coded 1, while countries scoring 
0.7 or higher are considered to be developed countries and are coded 0.  
 
5.2.4.5 Natural resources for exports as part of GDP 
The “resource curse” is not of direct theoretical interest to this thesis, but an increase in the 
shares of natural resources and fuels in exports have been shown to have a substantial effect on 
the levels of perceived corruption (Treisman, 2007). Countries where the extractive sector 
constitutes 25 percent or more of the GDP are highly dependent on this sector. Simply put, this 
dependence increases the potential for corruption by putting a small workforce, as compared to 
other sectors, in proximity to large amounts of wealth. Conceivably, such a large part of GDP 
will give the sector an outsized influence on political affairs, and should therefore correlate not 
only to corruption, but also to Rule of Law. By including this variable this interaction will be 




The data is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, as in the 2016 QoG dataset, 
with 179 observations from 2012. Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural 
gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents (Teorell et al., 2016).  
 
5.2.4.6 Interaction Variable 
H3 states that there is a positive relationship from income inequality to corruption which is 
dependent on trust, based on the assumption that inequality has a stronger effect on levels of 
perceived corruption in countries with low levels of trust than in countries with high levels of 
trust. In order to investigate this specific effect, I have created an interaction variable by 
multiplying two variables with each other (see Appendix A, section 10.4). The first variable is a 
dichotomous dummy variable for trust where countries scoring lower than the median have the 
value of 1 and the high-trust countries have the value of 0. This variable is then multiplied with 




5.3 DATA SUMMARY 
 
Dependent Variable Measure Source 
Corruption A compilation of expert interviews and 
surveys.  
0 = highly corrupt, 100 = not corrupt 
Min. year: 2014 
Max year: 2017 
N: 178 
Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index as 
in the 2019 QoG dataset (Teorell 
et al., 2019). 
Independent Variables   
Income Inequality Gini index of distribution of income. 
0 = perfect equality, 100 = perfect inequality  
Min. year: 2012 
Max. year 2017 
N: 114 
The World Bank’s GINI index 
as in the 2019 QoG dataset.  
Trust Generalized Social Trust question in surveys. 
0 = no trust, 100 = highest score 
Min. year: 2012 
Max. year: 2016 
N: 109 
The HUMAN Survey’s variable 
for Social Trust as in the 2019 
QoG dataset.  
Control variables   
Economic Development GDP per capita in current US dollars 
Min. year: 2011 
Max. year: 2014 
N: 190 
World Development Indicators 
as in the 2018 QoG dataset 
(Teorell et al., 2018) 
Democracy Combined Polity Score 
Min. year: 2012 
Max. year: 2016 
N: 163 
Polity IV Project as in the 2018 
QoG dataset 
Rule of Law Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent 
to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence.  
Min. Year:2013  
Max. Year: 2014 
N: 194 
World Bank’s World 
Governance Indicators as in the 
2018 QoG dataset 
Resource Revenue Total natural resources rents are the sum of 
oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard 
and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents. As a 
percentage of GDP. 
Min. Year: 2012  
Max. Year: 2012 
N: 179 
World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators as in the 
2016 QoG dataset (Teorell et al., 
2016) 
Human Development Index A long and healthy life, being educated 
and having a decent standard of living. 
Year: 2014 
N: 186 
United Nations Development 
Programme’s Human 
Development Index as in the 





6  METHOD 
 
For the analysis I have chosen to use the method of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) within the 
framework of the classical linear regression model (CLRM). OLS is a method to model a linear 
correlation, through the best possible fitted line, between the dependent variable (Transparency 
International’s Corruption Index, see section 5.2.1) and the independent variables (see section 
5.2.2 through section 5.3). Essentially, this method attempts to explain how variations in the 
dependent variable might be related to changes in the independent variables - allowing us to test 
our hypotheses (see chapter 4). OLS is a recognized method for large-N comparative studies and 
a primary advantage is that it allows for us to control for the effect of different variables (Midtbø, 
2007; Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2012).  
 
6.1 OLS REGRESSION - ASSUMPTIONS 
The basis of a regression equation is usually like the following:   
γ = β + β 𝑋 + ε 
 
In the equation, Y represents the dependent variable, X the independent variable, b0 is the 
intercept (or constant) which is where the fitted line crosses the Y-axis, b1 is the angle of the 
slope coefficient, and e is the error term/residual which contains the variation of Y that is not 
explained by X (Ringdal, 2013).  
 
I want the regression analysis to produce unbiased estimates with the smallest possible variance. 
The Gauss-Markov theorem states that if a linear regression satisfies the six classical CLRM 
assumptions, then it is a Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE).  
 
“The Gauss-Markov Theorem is telling us that in a regression model, where the expected 
value of our error terms is zero, 𝐸(𝜖 ) = 0 and variance of the error terms is constant 
and finite 𝜎 (𝜖 ) = 𝜎 < ∞ and 𝜖  and 𝜖  are uncorrelated for all 𝑖 and 𝑗, the least 
squares estimator 𝑏  and 𝑏  are unbiased and have minimum variance among all 




Below I will present the assumptions and the degree to which the main variables in my model 
satisfy these assumptions. This is to make sure my regression analysis produces unbiased 
estimates with the smallest possible variance and that it satisfies the assumptions.  
 
6.1.1 Assumption 1  
The linear regression model is linear in parameters 
 
The dependent variable (Y) needs to be the combination of independent variables (X) and the 
error term. Additionally, the model must be correctly specified to avoid specification bias and 
specification error (Gujarati & Porter, 2010, p. 54). This means that the model is linear in 
parameters, but not necessarily linear in variables. The model below satisfies the assumption:   
 
𝑌 = 𝑏 + 𝑏 𝑋 + 𝑒 
 
Scatterplots for the relationships between inequality and corruption and trust and corruption were 
created (see Appendix A, section 10.2). Additionally, if residuals are normally distributed (see 
assumption 3) and homoscedastic (see assumption 5), I do not need to worry about linearity 
(Goetsch, 2018).  
 
6.1.2 Assumption 2  
Independent variables are uncorrelated with the error term 
 
This assumption refers to what is called exogeneity. Endogeneity is the opposite and refers to 
when there exists a correlation between the independent variable and the error term. A 
correlation to the error term is also a correlation to the dependent variable.  
 
Although endogeneity occurs in several forms, the distinctions are not always sharp, and several 
sources of endogeneity may occur in the same equation (Jeffrey M Wooldridge, 2002, p. 51). 
The most relevant forms to this thesis are omitted variables, measurement error and reversed 




Unless we can explain all the variance, we can never be certain that the independent variables are 
uncorrelated to the error term. But according to Gujarati and Porter (Gujarati & Porter, 2010, p. 
97), if the variables in my model are non-stochastic (non-random, i.e. fixed numbers in repeated 
sampling) assumption 2 is fulfilled. As this is the case, and to the extent that I can test this 
assumption, there is nothing that indicates that assumption 2 has failed. Assumption 2 has been 
met.  
 
6.1.3 Assumption 3  
The error term follows a normal distribution and has a population mean of zero 
 
The error term is the variation in the dependent variable that the independent variable does not 
explain. As these values should be determined by random chance, the expected average value 
should equal zero (Gujarati & Porter, 2010, p. 55). Following this is the expectation that the error 
term follows a normal distribution. Yet the assumption of normality is optionable because it is 
not necessary for the validity of the OLS method nor for it to be BLUE. However, when error 
terms follow a normal distribution, we can perform statistical hypothesis testing and generate 
reliable prediction intervals and confidence intervals (Gujarati & Porter, 2010, p. 62). In other 
words, the error terms should be IID (Independent and Identically Distributed).  
 
To test this assumption, a histogram with a superimposed normal curve and a Predicted 
Probability (P-P) plot were created (see Appendix A, section 10.2). In the histogram, the mean 
and standard deviation should have values of approximately 0 and 1, respectively. This is the 
case for the histogram of the dependent variable (non-logarithmic) where the mean is 1.43E-14 
and the standard deviation is 0.943. As the histograms’ appearance largely depends on the 
selection of the correct bin/column width, which can be deceptive, I will additionally check the 
P-P plot (Laerd Statistics, 2015).  
 
In the P-P Plot, the residuals are not perfectly aligned along the diagonal line but are quite close. 
Because multiple regression analysis is fairly robust against deviations from normality, the 
residuals are close enough to normal for an analysis to proceed. With the mean in the histogram 




6.1.4 Assumption 4  
There is no perfect collinearity 
 
In case of more than one IV, there should be no exact linear relationships between them, 
meaning no perfect collinearity. Although there is no absolute number at which multicollinearity 
officially becomes a problem, it is best to avoid high correlations between the independent 
variables (Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2012, p. 95). If the degree of collinearity is high it affects the 
estimation procedure, producing high standard errors and coefficient estimates that become 
sensitive to small changes in the model, reducing the precision and explanatory power of the 
model. A solution may be to drop one of two variables that are measuring the same variance. It 
should be noted that this assumption allows for collinearity, just not perfect collinearity. As some 
collinearity will always exist between variables, excluding all collinearity would decrease the 
benefit of multiple regression analysis (Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2012, p. 84).  
  
In Model 2 in section 7, with all the independent variables included, only one variable has a 
VIF11 value above 5. GDP per capita has the highest VIF score, 6.097. Collinearity might 
therefore be at a problematic level (Christophersen, 2009, p. 161; Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2012, 
p. 84). A VIF score between 5 and 10 indicates high multicollinearity and might warrant a 
corrective measure. Yet there are several reasons why a corrective measure is not necessary in 
this case. A VIF of 6 is only slightly above 5 and it is already the natural logarithmic of the 
original variable. Additionally, the variables in the model are broad measurements that should 
correlate to economic development. As the remaining VIF scores range between 1 and 3.6, there 
is no perfect collinearity and assumption 4 has been met.  
 
6.1.5 Assumption 5  
The variance of the error term is homoscedastic 
 
For the error terms to be homoscedastic the error terms must have a constant and equal variance.  
If this is not the case, the regression model has heteroscedastic errors and will likely result in 
incorrect estimates, weakening conclusions concerning the statistical significance. This will not 
                                                 
11 As VIF is the reciprocal of Tolerance, I only need to consult one of these measures (Christophersen, 2009, p. 161).  
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alter the consistency or unbiasedness properties of OLS, but OLS estimators will not be efficient 




The scatterplot of standardized residuals versus standardized predicted values appear random, 
suggesting that the assumption of homoscedasticity has been met.  
 
6.1.6 Assumption 6  
There is no autocorrelation 
 
No autocorrelation means the error terms of different observations should not be correlated with 
each other. This is an assumption especially relevant for time-series regressions and is rarely 
included in cross-sectional regressions (Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2012). Despite this, I used the 
Durbin-Watson statistic to test this assumption. The Durbin-Watson value is 1.961, quite close to 





6.2 OLS REGRESSION - OTHER DELIBERATIONS 
6.2.1 Sources of Endogeneity 
In section 6.1.2 I mentioned that endogeneity can occur in several forms and that the distinctions 
are not always sharp. Below are the most relevant ways in which endogeneity might occur in this 
thesis.  
6.2.1.1 Measurement error 
Measurement errors arise when what we want to measure can only be observed through an 
imperfect measurement. When this happens, part of the causal effect on the DV might be 
excluded from the model and will therefore become part of the error term (Jeffrey M 
Wooldridge, 2002, p. 51). To avoid this, I have chosen to trust the expertise behind the pre-
constructed indexes. The disadvantage is that it is beyond the scope of this study to perform an 
independent evaluation of measurement error.  
 
6.2.1.2 Simultaneity and reversed causality 
Simultaneity occurs when an independent variable and the dependent variable are simultaneously 
determined. If this is so, then the independent variable and the error term are correlated (Jeffrey 
M Wooldridge, 2002, p. 51). Reverse causality occurs when the causal direction runs the 
opposite way to what we hypothesized. As this thesis a cross-sectional investigation of 
correlations, using the latest data for the three main variables, this is expected.  
 
6.2.1.3 Omitted Variables 
Omitting relevant variables leads to underfitting, or underspecifying, the model. To avoid this, a 
mis-specified model, it is important to consider all theoretically relevant variables when 
developing a model. At the same time, I do not wish to include irrelevant variables as they 
generally increase the variances of the other independent variables due to multicollinearity 
(Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2012). This problem is referred to as overfitting or overspecifying the 
model.  
 
To resolve this balance, I have generally included variables that are commonly accepted to have 
a significant relationship with corruption. In other words, I have used the same control variables 
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as those used in other relevant studies (see e.g., Chetwynd et al., 2003; Gupta et al., 1998; 
Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Treisman, 2007; Ünver & Koyuncu, 2016; J.-S. You & Khagram, 
2005). Using the same major control variables as other studies in the field has the added 
advantage of possibly generating comparable results.  
 
6.3 CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA 
There are several reasons why I have chosen to run a regression using cross-sectional data and 
not time-series data. Several of the variables in this thesis, especially corruption and inequality, 
have been shown not to vary much over time (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005, p. 65; J.-S. You & 
Khagram, 2005). Additionally, and most importantly, sporadic reporting from states on major 
variables such as GINI and the irregular surveys of trust makes a time-series analysis difficult to 
impossible. The World Values Survey time-series variable for generalized trust has an average of 
ten countries per year and three years of data per country (Teorell et al., 2019, p. 787). The 
source for trust in this thesis, the HUMAN Survey, has a time-series variable with an average of 
32 countries per year and eight years per country.  
 
In the surveys used for the CPI, year-to year changes can result from a changing methodology, 
different samples and different respondents. To counter this the CPI score is a 3-year moving 
average, meaning that changes are reflected in the score gradually. In a long-term perspective 
this should not invalidate the relevance of the data, but a year to year analysis or using lagged 
variables do not provide enough substantive insight to challenge the usefulness of a cross-
sectional analysis in the case of this thesis (Teorell et al., 2019, p. 619). The direction of 
causation is another important matter where the use of time-series data could be useful, but due 
to the lack of sufficient data this is not possible.  
 
As mentioned in chapter 5, all variables, except Resource Revenue and HDI, include data from 
several years. The number of years ranges from two to five, and because this is not controlled for 




6.3.1 Dealing with missing values 
Missing values is a challenge with cross-sectional data from a single year. Using a global dataset 
with many variables from several indexes will inevitably lead to missing values. Different 
indexes focus on different regions while some major measures, such as Gini and GDP per capita, 
depend on countries’ self-reporting - and countries don’t always report12. There are several ways 
of dealing with missing values, either by excluding them or substituting with the mean. 
Substituting with the mean would increase the N, but this must be weighed against the potential 
for biasing the coefficients towards the mean. It will also decrease the standard deviation and, 
following this, the standard error. The potential drawback is that the regression analysis provides 
results that are more accurate than they actually are, falsely providing significant coefficients 
(Christophersen, 2009, p. 164). Considering that only 73 of 194 countries have data for all the 
variables, I would have to impute values for the remaining 121 countries. In this study, excluding 
values listwise is the most valid approach for a rigorous analysis.  
 
6.4 DIRECTION OF CAUSALITY 
The causal direction cannot be determined in this study as I am not conducting a longitudinal 
study. While correlation is not sufficient to claim causality, the lack of a correlation can be taken 
as an indication of a lack of a causal relation. Although this approach cannot prove a causal link, 
it does open for the possibility of disproving it. So unless otherwise noted, whenever causality is 
mentioned it is informed and supported by theory, and not data.  
 
6.5 LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE 
Due to the differing number of observations per variable, only 73 countries are included in the 
regression. As a result, the p-values might be higher than what a more complete dataset would 
have. This is because the p-value calculations assume the null-hypothesis is true and that all 
variation in the sample is caused by chance. In general, sample variations and errors in cross-
                                                 
12 The data availability for income inequality was surprisingly low, with no data for many countries, even countries 
such as Japan, Algeria and Serbia (Teorell et al., 2019).  
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national comparisons are rarely random, and in many cases the ability of a state to report data is 
correlated with other underlying variables, such as corruption, GDP per capita or Rule of Law.   
 
A p-value does not directly prove or disprove a hypothesis, but a low p-value signifies statistical 
significance and that the null hypothesis can be rejected. If there are several alternatives to the 
null hypothesis, a rejection does not help in discerning which alternative is the correct one. 
Following this, I have chosen to formally test my hypotheses with a 95 percent threshold, that is 
a minimum significance of 0.05 or lower. This is done to avoid a type-II error. But due to the low 
number of countries and the issues surrounding data quality (as mentioned in chapter 5) a 
dynamic interpretation is preferable to a rigid disregard of variables with high p-values.  
6.6 SAMPLE QUALITY 
The goal of this paper is to perform a global comparison, but as mentioned above in section 6.3 
and 6.3.1, the lack of data precludes this possibility.  
Region Count 
Western Europe and North 
America 19 
Latin America 16 
Africa, sub-Saharan 15 
Eastern Europe and Ex-Soviet 
states 12 
Middle East and North Africa 7 
East Asia 2 
South East Asia 1 
South Asia 1 
Pacific None 
The Caribbean None 
Figure 1: List of regions with the number of countries included in the regression analysis. 
The table above13 reveals an imbalance in the sample of countries. National and regional 
variations increase in importance with an incomplete selection of countries, this is especially true 
if the selection is unbalanced. The four regions with the highest representation, though none are 
complete, are Western Europe and North America, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and 
Eastern Europe and Ex-Soviet states. The Middle East and North Africa, East Asia, South East 
                                                 
13 Hadenius and Teorell classified the world into ten politico-geographic regions, based on two considerations: 
geographical proximity and demarcation by area specialists (Teorell et al., 2019, p. 364).  
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Asia and South Asia are underrepresented. While no countries in the Pacific or Caribbean 
regions are included. For a complete list of the included countries, see Appendix A, section 10.1.  
 
Looking at the two descriptive statistics tables for corruption14 in section 10.6.1 we see a 0.69 
decrease in range, from 2.43 in the original variable with 178 countries to 1.74 for the 73 
countries in the study. This is a 28.4 percent decrease in range. The maximum value of 4.51 is 
the same for both variables, but the minimum value increases from 2.08 to 2.77. From the lower 
half of the original range (countries who scored less than 3.30) only 13 out of 34 countries are 
included in the 73-country sample.  
 
By only including 73 countries, the potential for generalizing to a global level is weakened. All 
results must be considered in light of the regional imbalance and the potential change that every 
additional country would bring.  
 
6.7 INTERACTION TERMS 
Many causal arguments require certain conditions to be met before an effect is present. It is 
therefore quite common to use interaction terms in quantitative political science. H3, which can 
be considered the main hypothesis of this thesis, is conditional in nature because the effect of X 
on Y is strongly, but not completely, conditioned by the value of Z. In other words, the effect of 
income inequality on corruption is different in a country with high levels of generalized trust 
than it is in a country with low levels of trust. Because the effect of income inequality on 
corruption varies according to the value of trust, an interaction term testing the specific context 
conditionality should be created (Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2005, p. 2).  
 
According to Brambor et al. (2005), 90% of surveyed articles15 ignored well-established 
methodological points when including an interaction term. They subsequently created a checklist 
to avoid the three most common mistakes made in multiplicative interaction models. Firstly, all 
                                                 
14 Note that both the full and 73-country corruption variables are the Natural Logarithms of the CPI.  
15 The survey included 156 articles from 1998 to 2002 from three political science journals: American Political 
Science Review, Journal of Politics, and American Journal of Political Science (Brambor et al., 2005).  
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constitutive terms should be included. In other words, all variables that constitute the interaction 
term must be included as independent variables in the model (Brambor et al., 2005, p. 4). A 
simple regression equation is similar to that of a normal regression equation (see section 6.1) and 
looks something like this:  
𝑌 = β + β 𝑋 + β 𝑍 + β 𝑋𝑍 + ε 
Secondly, constitutive terms should not be interpreted as independent or unconditional effects as 
they would be in a linear-additive regression model. The independent effects of X and Z in the 
model cannot be interpreted in isolation. In a multiplicative interaction model, the effect of 
independent variable X on dependent variable Y depends on a modifying independent variable Z. 
When an interaction term (X*Z) is present in the model, and if Z is a dichotomous 0-1 variable, 
the independent variable X can only be interpreted as the effect of X on Y when Z is absent, i.e. 
Z=0 (Brambor et al., 2005; Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2012), simplifying the equation to:  
Y = β + β X + ε 
Likewise, the effect of the interaction term can only be interpreted as the effect of X on Y when 
Z is present, i.e. Z=1.  
 
Finally, substantively meaningful marginal effects must be presented in a more informative and 
detailed manner. This will be done by including a graph (see section 10.8) that illustrates the 
interaction terms’ marginal effects and substantial significance. Because the conditioning 
variable is a dichotomous dummy variable, I will not be able to interpret the effect at many 
different levels of trust, but the graph will help us see the interaction term’s substantive and 
statistical significance in a more informative and detailed manner (Berry, Golder, & Milton, 
2012; Kolnes, 2016).  
 
Additionally, because the interaction term is standardized along with the other variables the 
standardized betas cannot be interpreted. Instead the unstandardized betas (B) should be used 




Due to the high collinearity between the constitutive variables and the interaction term, 
multicollinearity will be higher in such a model. However, this also shows the lack of sufficient 
data to provide accurate estimations of the parameters, which is correctly reflected in the larger 
standard errors (Brambor et al., 2005, p. 62). Centering the variables is suggested as a remedy for 
this issue (e.g., Christophersen, 2009), but this has been criticized as substantively ineffectual by 





The standardized beta coefficient standardizes the variables before the regression is run. By 
placing them on the same scale it is possible to compare the relative effects of each variable on 
the dependent variable. However, as written in section 6.7, a model that includes an interaction 
term complicates the interpretation of coefficients. Following this, model 3 will be interpreted 
with caution, focusing on the unstandardized betas (B), statistical significance, the direction of 
the correlation and any other results of interest.  
 
When reading the results, it is important to remember that a higher score on the corruption 
variable equals lower levels of perceived corruption16. This means that while a .2 beta will 



























                                                 
16 Think of the score as an evaluation or test, where a higher score is better.  
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Running the OLS regression described above in SPSS provides the following results:  
 
Adjusted R Squares 
Model 1: .756   
Model 2: .767   
Model 3: .808 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
Sig. B Std. Error Beta VIF 
1 (Constant) 3.082 .416  .000  
Income Inequality -.005 .004 -.093 .203 1.530 
GDP per capita .114 .035 .415 .002 4.881 
Rule of Law  -.433 .073 -.500 .000 2.099 
Democracy  .069 .069 .075 .320 1.668 
HDI  .115 .098 .129 .244 3.533 
Natural Resources  -.204 .128 -.110 .116 1.413 
2 (Constant) 3.060 .406  .000  
Income Inequality  .000 .004 -.007 .936 2.077 
GDP per capita .079 .039 .287 .045 6.097 
Rule of Law  -.442 .071 -.511 .000 2.107 
Democracy  .104 .069 .113 .141 1.773 
HDI .094 .096 .105 .333 3.574 
Natural Resources  -.232 .126 -.125 .070 1.430 
Trust  .005 .002 .186 .045 2.574 
3 (Constant) 3.073 .369  .000  
Income Inequality  -.010 .005 -.187 .037 2.904 
GDP per capita .064 .035 .233 .074 6.170 
Rule of Law  -.461 .065 -.532 .000 2.119 
Democracy  .097 .063 .105 .130 1.774 
HDI  .043 .089 .048 .628 3.656 
Natural Resources -.235 .114 -.127 .044 1.430 
Trust  .014 .003 .554 .000 5.986 
Trust (dummy) x 
Inequality 








Model 1:  
 
The adjusted R square, or R2, of model 1 is .756, which means that 75.6% of the variation in 
corruption is explained by the independent variables of the model17. At -.093, the standardized 
beta coefficient (beta) for inequality indicates that if there is a relationship between the two it is 
not a very strong one. The correlation between income inequality and corruption is surprisingly 
low and is not statistically significant (p=.203). Looking at the other beta coefficients we see that 
Rule of Law has the strongest correlation with corruption with a beta of -.500 while GDP per 
capita has the second strongest correlation with a beta of .415 – both are significant at the 1% 
level. This means that for every unit increase in GDP per capita there will be a .415 unit decrease 
in the level of perceived corruption. Democracy, HDI and Natural Resources are not statistically 
significant.  
 
Model 2: Introducing Trust 
 
The adjusted R2 of model 2 is .767. This is a modest change from an R2 of .756 in model 1. 
However, an R2 close to 8 for both models means their explanatory power is very high and 
indicates some good choices with regards to the selection of control variables.  
 
Income inequality’s beta has increased by .086 to -.007, but its p-value has had a significant 
increase to .936. The new variable, Trust, has a moderate effect with a beta of .186 and is 
statistically significant at the 5% level (p=.045). Rule of Law still has the highest correlation 
with a beta of -.511 and a p-value of .000. GDP per capita still has the second strongest beta but 
has fallen to .287, with a p-value of .045. At 6.097, GDP per capita’s VIF reveals that its 
variance is 509.7% more likely to be inflated than it would be if it was not correlated to the other 
independent variables1819, slightly weakening the reliability  
                                                 
17 Unlike the R Square, the adjusted R2 penalizes a higher number of variables and only increases if a variable adds 
to the explanatory power of the model more than what would be expected by chance (Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2012).  
18 Rule of Law is an apparent source of this inflation as it has a high correlation to corruption, trust and GDP per 
capita. The scatterplot in section 10.7.6 reveals an R2 of .602 between GDP per capita and Rule of Law.  
19 GDP per capita’s beta decreased with .128 and its VIF increased by 1.216 in model 2, signifying a correlation to 
trust. This high collinearity should not be considered surprising for several reasons. A strong beta and the scatterplot 
in section 10.2 show that GDP per capita’s explanatory power is high. As mentioned in section 2.1, bias among 
survey respondents might increase the correlation between economic wealth and corruption, by rating wealthier 
countries as less corrupt and poorer countries as more corrupt. Low levels of perceived corruption and high 
economic development both correlate to stronger rule of law, strong institutions, efficient bureaucracies and high 
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of its estimates (Allison, 2012). Yet it is not high enough to warrant a corrective measure20.  
 
The coefficients of Democracy, HDI and Natural Resources have slight changes in model 2, but 
they are still not statistically significant.  
 
 
Model 3: Introducing the Interaction Term 
  
The adjusted R2 of model 3 is .808, the highest of the three models. Including the interaction 
term has also changed the estimates of several variables, but the standardized betas should not be 
interpreted as reflecting the actual standardized betas for the reasons mentioned in section 6.7. 
To avoid drawing incorrect conclusions I will interpret the unstandardized betas, referred to as B.  
 
As the non-modifying constitutive term of the interaction term, Income Inequality’s B has 
strengthened in effect from 0 to -0.01 and is now significant at the 5% level (p=.037). Trust, the 
source for the dichotomous variable which serves as the modifying constitutive term of the 
interaction term, has increased from a B of .005 to .014 and is significant at the 1% level 
(p=.000). The changes in effect size and lower p-values must be seen in light of the interaction 
term and their roles in it.  
 
The interaction term has a B of .01 and is statistically significant at the 1% level (p=.000). But 
contrary to much of the literature reviewed for this thesis it has a positive sign, meaning that 
income inequality in low-trust countries is associated with an improvement on the corruption 
score, which is a decrease in the level of perceived corruption. In other words, income inequality 
in low-trust countries correlates to less corruption21. This is very interesting. In models 1 and 2, 
                                                 
levels of trust. Yet the strong correlation does not imply causal direction, and it may be that corruption leads to less 
economic development. Despite a very strong correlation, the direction and specifics of this relationship is not fully 
understood, and neither are the roles played by income inequality and trust.  
20 If it were higher, there are several corrective measures I could use, such as performing a different kind of 
regression that handles multicollinearity better, removing the variable or transforming the variable. As GDP per 
capita is already the natural logarithm of the original data and running a different kind of regression is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, removing the variable would be the most relevant option. However, I should consider that the 
high VIF is not problematic insomuch as it is emblematic of the complex interdependence of the real world and of 
the difficulty of trying to isolate the effects of specific measurements.  
21 Since the interaction term was first created and used in the model, it has had a positive sign. That it took some 




inequality’s variance was all in one variable and was statistically insignificant – indicating that 
the variance was too dispersed. Now that its variance is split in two, high-trust and low-trust 
countries, both the interaction term and income inequality are statistically significant.  
 
As expected, the VIF-values of Income Inequality and Trust have increased with the introduction 
of the interaction term. Trust’s VIF nearly doubled to 5.986 while Income Inequality’s VIF 
increased only slightly from 2.077 to 2.904. As the interaction term is an interaction of effects 
already present in the model, a high VIF is expected, and at 7.569 it is not problematic.  
 
The B’s of Rule of Law, Democracy and Natural Resources have not changed much and are 
statistically significant at the 5%-level, while GDP per capita (p=.074), Democracy (p=.13) and 







Here I discuss how the hypotheses hold up in view of the regression results.  
8.1 HYPOTHESIS 1  
Higher levels of income inequality lead to higher levels of corruption   
 
Model 1 provides weak and inconclusive results for the direct correlation between income 
inequality and corruption. As can be seen in the regression results above, this hypothesis does 
not find support in the data. The threshold of significance is at 0.05 (see section 6.5) and a p-
value of .203 indicates a 20.3 percent likelihood of erroneously discarding the null hypothesis. 
Since both income inequality and corruption are natural logarithms, the beta can be interpreted as 
a 9.3% increase in corruption, which in linear algebra terms is not a steep slope. Strengthening 
the null-hypothesis is the constant, which at 3.082 means that even with perfect equality the 
model predicts a moderate level of corruption22. The beta of Income Inequality in model 1 is 
very weak, add to this the high p-values and it is easy to conclude that there is no relationship23.  
 
In model 2, the inclusion of trust has decreased Income Inequality to statistical insignificance 
and the constant is nearly unchanged. Although a lack of direct correlation does not negate or 
cancel a hypothesis, the data in model 1 and model 2 does not provide grounds for rejecting the 
null-hypothesis of H1.  
 
Discussion and theoretical implications: 
The lack of a statistically significant direct correlation between inequality and corruption finds 
support in some studies but is contrary to the findings of others. Several studies (Treisman, 2000, 
2007; J.-S. You & Khagram, 2005) found that there is a weak direct correlation, but when certain 
economic and institutional factors are controlled for, especially GDP per capita, this correlation 
                                                 
22 The range of the Corruption variable goes from 2.08 to 4.51, with the mean and median both at 3.6. See 
descriptive statistics tables for Corruption in section 10.6.1.  
23 But this might be due to a lack of information. The interaction term in model 3 reveals a correlation that is not 
possible to see in models 1 or 2.  
58 
 
weakens even further. The results in models 1 and 2 seem to support these findings with both 
GDP per capita and Rule of Law having the strongest correlations to corruption. 
 
Data availability might explain part of this, as mentioned in section 6.6 the variance of 
corruption is smaller among the 73 countries in the regression than it is in the original variable. 
Yet a true global study might not be necessary to produce a more accurate relationship. The 
scatterplot between Income Inequality and Trust in section 10.6.3 reveals a clear split in the 
spread at the median of trust, with all but one country clearly belonging to either the higher-trust 
group or the lower trust group. If this effect is not controlled for, the variance will naturally 
result in a high p-value. This interaction is further explored in model 3.  
 
In Kelly’s model of crime and economy (see section 3.2.1), inequality does not correlate to 
corruption, but poverty does. The findings both here and in the literature on corruption supports 
the strong and significant correlation between GDP per capita and corruption. But Kelly’s model 
cannot disprove the potential for an indirect correlation from income inequality through another 
variable or, as model 3 also reveals, a direct correlation.  
 
8.2 HYPOTHESIS 2 
Trust is a significant variable in explaining corruption 
 
The second hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between trust and corruption – higher 
levels of trust correlate to higher levels of corruption. The regression results in model 2 show 
that trust has a moderate positive correlation that is statistically significant. Yet, considering the 
beta of 0.186 in terms of linear algebra, the slope is not very steep. And at 3.06, the constant in 
model 2 has barely changed to that of model 1 and signifies that even with no trust, there is only 
a moderate level of corruption. Despite the strength of the correlation being slightly weaker than 
expected24, the data in model 2 provides grounds for rejecting the null-hypothesis of H2.  
 
                                                 
24 The scatterplot between trust and corruption in section 10.2 reveals an R2 of .201, but this scatterplot includes 
many countries that are excluded in the models above. The scatterplot with countries only in the regression result in 
an R2 of .298.  
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Discussion and theoretical implications: 
H2 did not fail, but as the hypothesized causal drive and main link to corruption the correlation 
was weaker than expected. According to Morris (Morris & Klesner, 2010), a culture of mistrust 
precludes the creation of a universalistic ethos. As humans, we infer on the world our 
experiences and beliefs. Low generalized trust means we do not expect others to honor their 
duties and obligations - violating Rawls’ well-ordered society - and leading to individualistic 
approaches to problems. In the “absence of the authoritative interpretation and enforcement of 
the rules” individuals are more likely to break them (Rothstein, 2013). Low trust should therefore 
correlate to more corruption. However, the institutional control variables are included in the 
models due to their correlation to corruption.  As seen in chapter 7, they also correlate to trust 
and modify the effect of trust further. The moderate effect is therefore not necessarily much 
lower than what should be expected.  
 
8.3 HYPOTHESIS 3 
There is a positive relationship from income inequality to corruption which is dependent 
on trust 
 
In contrast to inconclusive results in models 1 and 2, model 3 reveals a statistically significant 
correlation from income inequality to corruption, in both high- and low-trust countries. In low-
trust countries the interaction term has a weak but statistically significant correlation to 
corruption. Because the interaction term is included, the variable Income Inequality captures the 
variance that the interaction term does not (see section 6.7) and reveals a statistically significant 
moderate correlation to corruption in high-trust countries. The p-values for inequality in the first 
two models indicated a very low possibility that inequality is correlated to corruption. This 
changes in model 3, where the interaction term and inequality are statistically significant. Low p-
values are expected for the constitutive terms of the interaction term and this is especially true 
here. As mentioned above, the scatterplot in 10.6.3 reveals that there are two variances for 
Income Inequality that are pulling in different directions – depending on the level of trust. By 
separating the variance in two, the p-values for Income Inequality and the interaction term reflect 




To further interpret the interaction term, I produced a graph (see section 10.8) that illustrates the 
interaction term’s marginal effects and substantial significance. I did this in the statistical 
program Stata with the “grinter” command25. It shows the marginal effect of the interaction term 
on corruption on the vertical axis with values of the conditioning variable26, trust, on the 
horizontal axis. The angle of the slope reveals that the effect is not substantively significant, and 
because the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval cross the zero value of the vertical 
axis and are not, except  for trust when it is zero, fully above or below, the marginal effect of the 
interaction term is not statistically significant. However, because the interaction term is 
significant at zero, we can say that income inequality in high-trust countries is statistically 
significant (Berry et al., 2012).  
 
The most interesting result, however, is the direction of the sign. The interaction term reveals 
that income inequality leads to lower levels of corruption in low-trust countries, while decreasing 
corruption in high-trust countries. In other words, H3 is only partially rejected. There is a 
correlation from inequality to corruption and it depends on trust, but the correlation is not only 
positive - in this study. Depending on the level of trust, the correlation is either positive or 
negative. A partial rejection is still a rejection and we can conclude that the data does not give 
grounds to reject the null-hypothesis of H3.  
 
Discussion and theoretical implications:  
While the interaction term highlighted a link between inequality and corruption through trust, the 
results contradicted much of the literature. The inequality trap argues that income inequality 
leads to lower levels of generalized trust, leading to more corruption, which in turn leads to 
higher income inequality and less trust, creating a loop - or trap. The interaction term was 
hypothesized to support this theory through a positive correlation to corruption, in that inequality 
in both low- and high-trust societies correlates to more corruption - and therefore a lower score 
                                                 
25 I was not able to find a simple and similar method of graphically illustrating interactions in SPSS. The variables 
used in Stata were the same as those used in SPSS. A check of regression ouputs revealed the results were the same.  
26 Although I consider the dichotomous dummy variable for trust to be the conditioning variable, its effect also 
varies with the value of inequality. This is due to the inherent symmetry of interactions (Berry et al., 2012; Brambor 
et al., 2005).  
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on the corruption scale. However, what the data reveals are two distinctly different correlations: 
positive in high-trust countries and negative in low-trust countries.  
 
Countries with a high level of trust have a stronger sense of unity and a belief in a bright future 
(Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). Thus, one could theorize, higher inequality leads to a stronger 
sense of economic disenfranchisement than in a low-trust society, which in turn leads to a lower 
threshold for violating the laws and participating in corrupt practices.  
 
Considering GDP per capita’s correlation to corruption, income inequality and trust, as seen in 
the regression and in the scatterplots in section 10.2 and 10.7, it is an important part of the 
dynamic. But the correlations are different for the full-N variables and the variables only 
including countries in this regression. Inequality and GDP per capita’s very low R2 of .099 
increases to .223 for the variables used in the regression. For these countries the correlation is 
more than twice as strong as the global average, significantly inhibiting the potential for 
generalizing the findings to a larger population. The difference in R2 for Trust and GDP per 
capita is moderate, increasing from .291 to .365 in the variables used for the regression. In other 
words, for the countries in this regression economic development plays a larger role than what 
can be observed in the full-N sample. But despite the outsized role of economic development and 
the interaction term’s weak unstandardized beta, the correlation is present and significant.  
 
Corruption is expensive. In low-trust societies higher levels of inequality also mean lower 
economic development. This means that while many poor people might be too poor to 
participate, the lower number of richer people simply do not have to participate, or at least they 
do not contribute to a high level of perceived corruption.  
 
The dynamic that we see in low-trust societies might be partially explained by looking at 
literature on regional variations. Despite the theoretical and empirical support mentioned in 
section 3.3.3.1, my data provided only some support for these findings. Two separate 
regressions, one excluding countries with a socialist legal origin (see section 10.5.2) and the 
other excluding Eastern European and ex-Soviet countries (see section 10.5.3), reveal a stronger 
coefficient for Income Inequality and a very weak GDP per capita. Although these results are 
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interesting and should be investigated further, they do not significantly challenge the findings of 
the regression in chapter 7 and are – beyond this mention – outside the scope of this paper.  
 
The interaction term’s negative correlation is weak and should be interpreted in light of the many 
weaknesses with the study; the most corrupt countries are underrepresented; there are regional 
imbalances in the country selection; corruption is not a direct measure of corruption, but is the 
perception of corruption among survey respondents; data for most of the variables is not from a 
single year, but from several years. Should any of these issues be improved, or modified, the B 
of 0.01 will change – in either direction. Yet the coefficient stands, and the dynamic of the 












In this thesis I have investigated the link between income inequality, generalized trust and 
corruption. The goal was to investigate underlying socio-political determinants of corruption. To 
answer the research question Does inequality have an effect on corruption and is this effect 
dependent on trust, I created three hypotheses that investigated different aspects of the research 
question. H1 failed and H2 rejected its null-hypothesis. The last one, H3, can also be considered 
the main hypothesis: There is a positive relationship from income inequality to corruption which 
is dependent on trust. What I found was that H3 was only partly true. The interaction term 
provides counter-intuitive results, contradicting much of the literature on the inequality trap and 
highlights the need for additional investigations. As to whether this invalidates the underlying 
theories of the thesis, the answer is no; failing to prove a positive is not sufficient evidence for a 
negative. But my findings do question the universality of the inequality trap. However, the 
results show that inequality is more than an aspect of economic development and is an important 
socio-economic variable in studies on corruption and trust.  
 
The lack of evidence supporting H3, generated from the inequality trap and Rothstein and 
Uslaner’s stickiness model, indicates that their importance in explaining persistent corruption 
may be overstated or misunderstood. Ideally, this should be further investigated through 
longitudinal studies drawing on panel data.  
 
The theories supporting my hypotheses have therefore not been disproven, I have only 
demonstrated that with the data in my regression and the method of analysis there is insufficient 
grounds to accept them all.  
 
9.1 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In the process of writing this thesis there have been many interesting variables and interactions 




In terms of data, improvements in data availability will enable time-series analysis, and 
improvements in data quality, especially measurements for trust, corruption and different kinds 
of inequality, will benefit future studies greatly. Income inequality as measured through a Gini 
index is only one measurement and any results should be considered in light of this. As more and 
different types of data become available and more research is being done, other kinds of 
inequality can reveal new insights – for example age- and education specific measure of income. 
A good example is the skewness of the distribution of income; You, Gould and Morris all found 
that inequality at the bottom of the income distribution leads to lower trust than inequality at the 
top or middle. Additionally, measures of inequality do not measure the perception of inequality, 
which should correlate to the level of trust better than a simple Gini index. Studies including 
these kinds of inequality will provide interesting insights to the dynamic inequality-trust-
corruption.  
 
More studies on regional and country-specific variations would be of great added value to the 
field. The multidimensionality and conditional complexity of the variables and their relationships 





10 APPENDIX A: CHARTS, GRAPHS, SYNTAX AND OTHER 
OUTPUT 
10.1 COUNTRIES IN REGRESSION 
N=73 
Argentina Ecuador Latvia Romania 
Austria Egypt Liberia Russia 
Belgium El Salvador Lithuania Rwanda 
Bolivia Estonia Luxembourg Slovakia 
Brazil Finland Madagascar Slovenia 
Bulgaria France Malaysia Spain 
Burundi Georgia Mauritius Sweden 
Cameroon Germany Mexico Switzerland 
Canada Ghana Morocco Togo 
Chile Greece Mozambique Turkey 
China Guatemala Namibia Uganda 
Colombia Guinea Netherlands United Kingdom 
Costa Rica Honduras Nicaragua United States 
Cote d'Ivoire Hungary Niger Uruguay 
Croatia Iraq Norway Yemen 
Cyprus Ireland Pakistan Zambia 
Czech Republic Israel Panama   
Denmark Italy Peru   
Dominican Republic Korea, South Portugal   
 
According to region:  
Region Count 
Western Europe and North 
America 19 
Latin America 16 
Africa, sub-Saharan 15 
Eastern Europe and Ex-Soviet 
states 12 
Middle East and North Africa 7 
East Asia 2 
South East Asia 1 
South Asia 1 
Pacific None 





Assumption 1:  
 




Figure 3: Scatterplot only including the 73 countries in the regression.  
 













Figure 6: Both are the Natural Logarithm of their respective variables. 
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10.3 HISTOGRAM FOR NATURAL RESOURCES 
 





10.4 NEW VARIABLES 
 
LN Corruption (2019) 
COMPUTE lnCorruption_2019=LN(ti_cpi_2019).  
EXECUTE. 
 
LN GDP per capita 
COMPUTE lnGDPpc=LN(GDPpc).  
EXECUTE. 
 
Dummy for low Trust by median (2019) 
RECODE SocialTrust (Lowest thru 30=1) (30.1 thru Highest=0) INTO dTrust_2019.  
VARIABLE LABELS  dTrust_2019 'Trust (dummy) 2019'.  
EXECUTE. 
 
Interaction term for low Trust and Income Inequality (2019) 
COMPUTE TrustxInequality_2019=dTrust_2019 * Gini_2019.  
EXECUTE.  
 
Dummy for Low Rule of Law by median 
RECODE wbgi_rle (Lowest thru -.23=1) (-.22 thru Highest=0) INTO dRuleofLaw_median.  
VARIABLE LABELS  dRuleofLaw_median 'Rule of Law’.  
EXECUTE.  
 
Dummy for full democracy from polity IV 
RECODE p_polity (Lowest thru 6=0) (7 thru Highest=1) INTO dPolityIV. 
VARIABLE LABELS  dPolityIV 'Democracy'. 
EXECUTE. 
Low HDI dummy 
RECODE HDI (Lowest thru 0.69=1) (0.7 thru Highest=0) INTO dHDI.  
VARIABLE LABELS  dHDI 'HDI'.  
EXECUTE. 
 
Dummy for Natural Resources at 25 % of GDP 
RECODE wdi_natrr (25 thru Highest=1) (Lowest thru 24=0) INTO dNatrr. 






10.5 OTHER REGRESSIONS 






10.5.2 Regression excluding countries with Socialist Legal Origin 
Model 1: .788 
Model 2: .803 






t Sig. B Std. Error Beta VIF 
1 (Constant) 4.086 .553  7.382 .000  
Income Inequality -.014 .005 -.237 -2.810 .007 1.886 
GDP per capita .048 .045 .184 1.077 .287 7.710 
Democracy .099 .079 .105 1.245 .219 1.868 
Rule of Law -.432 .084 -.488 -5.165 .000 2.360 
HDI -.011 .117 -.012 -.091 .928 4.470 
Natural Resources -.337 .131 -.196 -2.584 .013 1.525 
2 (Constant) 4.025 .534  7.530 .000  
Income Inequality -.008 .006 -.131 -1.377 .175 2.564 
GDP per capita .010 .047 .038 .211 .833 8.986 
Democracy .118 .077 .125 1.529 .133 1.892 
Rule of Law -.436 .081 -.492 -5.405 .000 2.361 
HDI -.047 .114 -.052 -.411 .683 4.567 
Natural Resources -.377 .127 -.219 -2.964 .005 1.557 
Trust .005 .002 .222 2.183 .034 2.950 
3 (Constant) 3.849 .523  7.363 .000  
Income Inequality -.014 .006 -.232 -2.244 .030 3.253 
GDP per capita .012 .045 .047 .272 .787 8.992 
Democracy .117 .074 .124 1.573 .122 1.892 
Rule of Law -.470 .080 -.531 -5.912 .000 2.463 
HDI -.041 .110 -.045 -.370 .713 4.570 
Natural Resources -.342 .124 -.199 -2.754 .008 1.585 
Trust .012 .004 .483 3.072 .004 7.541 
Trust (dummy) x 
Inequality 





10.5.3 Regression excluding Eastern European and ex-Soviet countries.  
 
Model 1: .774 
Model 2: .785 






t Sig. B Std. Error Beta VIF 
1 (Constant) 3.760 .529  7.110 .000  
Income Inequality -.010 .005 -.164 -2.105 .040 1.616 
GDP per capita .066 .044 .241 1.495 .141 6.903 
Democracy .095 .077 .101 1.240 .220 1.750 
Rule of Law -.467 .082 -.518 -5.673 .000 2.207 
HDI .008 .111 .009 .072 .943 3.888 
Natural Resources -.261 .134 -.144 -1.952 .056 1.447 
2 (Constant) 3.765 .515  7.310 .000  
Income Inequality -.005 .005 -.078 -.891 .377 2.145 
GDP per capita .026 .047 .094 .540 .591 8.441 
Democracy .136 .078 .145 1.759 .084 1.885 
Rule of Law -.485 .081 -.537 -6.004 .000 2.232 
HDI -.019 .109 -.021 -.177 .860 3.950 
Natural Resources -.287 .131 -.158 -2.190 .033 1.461 
Trust .005 .002 .193 1.985 .052 2.643 
3 (Constant) 3.687 .477  7.726 .000  
Income Inequality -.015 .006 -.253 -2.574 .013 3.156 
GDP per capita .019 .044 .069 .426 .672 8.462 
Democracy .135 .072 .143 1.876 .066 1.885 
Rule of Law -.509 .075 -.563 -6.775 .000 2.256 
HDI -.037 .101 -.041 -.368 .714 3.963 
Natural Resources -.274 .121 -.151 -2.262 .028 1.463 
Trust .014 .004 .558 3.800 .000 7.032 
Trust (dummy) x 
Inequality 
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10.7 ADDITIONAL SCATTERPLOTS 
10.7.1 Income Inequality and Trust 
 
Figure 9: With only the 73 countries in the regression. Red line is median of Trust.  
10.7.2 Trust and GDP per capita 
 












10.7.3 Income Inequality and GDP per capita 
 
Figure 12: With only the 73 countries in the regression. 
 
Figure 13: Full-N variables.  
82 
 
10.7.4 Trust and Democracy 
 
Figure 14: With only the 73 countries in the regression. 
 
10.7.5 Trust and HDI 
 
Figure 15: With only the 73 countries in the regression. 
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10.7.6 GDP per capita and Rule of Law 
 
Figure 16: With only the 73 countries in the regression. 
 
 











10.8 GRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATION OF INTERACTIONS 
 
Command in Stata:  
grinter Gini, inter(dTrustxInequality) const02(dTrust) depvar(lnCorruption) 
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11 APPENDIX B 
11.1 CPI MEASUREMENTS 
The source data captures the following aspects of corruption:  
- Bribery 
- Diversion of public funds 
- Prevalence of officials using public office for private gain without facing consequences 
- Ability of governments to contain corruption and enforce effective integrity mechanisms 
in the public sector 
- Red tape and excessive bureaucratic burden which may increase opportunities for 
corruption 
- Meritocratic versus nepotistic appointments in the civil service 
- Effective criminal prosecution for corrupt officials 
- Adequate laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest prevention for public 
officials 
- Legal protection for whistleblowers, journalists, investigators when they are reporting 
cases of bribery and corruption 
- State capture by narrow vested interests 
- Access of civil society to information on public affairs 
(Transparency International, 2018b, p. 2) 
The source data does not capture the following manifestations of corruption:   
- Citizen perceptions or experience of corruption  
- Tax fraud 
- Illicit financial flows 
- Enablers of corruption (lawyers, accountants, financial advisors etc)  
- Money-laundering 
- Private sector corruption 
- Informal economies and markets 
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